1 2	Timothy M. Hogan (004567) Jennifer B. Anderson (015605) ARIZONA CENTER FOR LAW
3	IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 514 W. Roosevelt Street
4	Phoenix, Arizona 85003 (602) 258-8850
5	thogan@aclpi.org janderson@aclpi.org
6	Attorneys for Southwest Energy Efficiency Project
7	Adam L. Stafford (025317)
8	WESTERN RESOURCE ADVOCATES 1429 N. 1st Street, Suite 100 Phoening Asignes 85004
9	Phoenix, Arizona 85004 (602) 562-9903
10	Adam.Stafford@westernresources.org Attorney for Western Resource Advocates
11	BEFORE THE ARIZONA CORPORATION COMMISSION
12	
13	COMMISSIONERS ROBERT "BOB" BURNS, Chairman
14	BOYD W. DUNN
15	SANDRA D. KENNEDY
16	JUSTIN OLSON LEA MÁRQUEZ PETERSON
17	IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION Docket No. E-01345A-19-0236
18	OF ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY FOR A HEARING TO
19	DETERMINE THE FAIR VALUE OF THE UTILITY VALUE OF THE COMPANY SOUTHWEST ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROJECT'S AND WESTERN
20	FOR RATEMAKING PURPOSES, TO FIX A JUST AND REASONABLE RATE OF OF FILING DIRECT TESTIMONY OF
21	RETURN THEREON, AND TO APPROVE RATE SCHEDULES DESIGNED TO BRENDON BAATZ (RATE DESIGN)
22	DEVELOP SUCH RETURN.
23	
24	The Southwest Energy Efficiency Project ("SWEEP") and Western Resourc
25	Advocates ("WRA") hereby submit the redacted Direct Testimony (Rate Design) and exhibit
26	of Brendon Baatz in the above-captioned docket.

ACC - Docket Control - Received 10/9/2020 3:49 PM ACC - Docket Control - Docketed 10/9/2020 4:01 PM

The highly confidential version of Mr. Baatz' Direct Testimony is being provided under 1 2 seal to the Commission and to Arizona Public Service ("APS"). Parties who have entered into 3 the Protective Agreement will be able to view the confidential version of Mr. Baatz' testimony 4 and exhibits by accessing the APS Rate Case website. 5 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 9th day of October 2020. 6 /s/ Jennifer Anderson 7 Timothy M. Hogan 8 Jennifer B. Anderson ARIZONA CENTER FOR LAW IN THE 9 PUBLIC INTEREST 10 514 W. Roosevelt Street Phoenix, AZ 85003 11 Attorneys for Southwest Energy Efficiency Project 12 13 /s/ Adam Stafford 14 Adam L. Stafford 15 WESTERN RESOURCE ADVOCATES 1429 N. 1st Street, Suite 100 16 Phoenix, Arizona 85004 Attorney for Western Resource Advocates 17 18 ORIGINAL electronically filed this 19 9th day of October, 2020, with: 20 Docket Control 21 ACC Portal for efiling 22 COPIES (8) hand-delivered 23 this 9th day of October, 2020 to: Docket Control 24 Arizona Corporation Commission 25 1200 West Washington Street Phoenix, Arizona 26

1	COPIES of the foregoing mailed or emailed this
2	9th day of October, 2020 to:
	Albert H Acken DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC
3	1850 N Central Ave., Suite 1400
4	Phoenix AZ 85004
5	aacken@dickinson-wright.com
6	Armando Nava
7	The Nava Law Firm PLLC
	1641 E Osborn Rd Ste 8
8	Phoenix AZ 85016
9	Filings@navalawaz.com
10	Court Rich
(Nasara	Rose Law Group PC
11	7144 E Stetson Drive Suite 300
12	Scottsdale AZ 85251 CRich@RoseLawGroup.com
13	
14	Daniel Pozefsky
14	RUCO
15	1110 West Washington, Suite 220
16	Phoenix AZ 85007 jfuentes@azruco.gov
	procedural@azruco.gov
17	rdelafuente@azruco.gov
18	dpozefsky@azruco.gov
19	David Bender
20	EARTHJUSTICE
20	1001 G Street, NW, Suite1000
21	Washington DC 20001
22	dbender@earthjustice.org
23	Garry Hays
	Law Office of Garry Hays PC
24	2198 E Camelback Rd Suite 230
25	Phoenix AZ 85016 Ghays@lawgdh.com
- 1	Langue (d) lawadh com

1	Giancario Estrada
2	KAMPER ESTRADA, LLP
-	3030 N. 3rd Street, Suite 770
3	Phoenix AZ 85012
4	gestrada@lawphx.com
7	
5	Greg Patterson
6	Munger Chadwick/Competitive Power Alliance
0	5511 S. Jolly Roger Tempe AZ 85283
7	Greg@azcpa.org
8	<u>Orege azepa.org</u>
	Gregory M. Adams
9	515 N. 27th St.
10	Boise ID 83702
-2-3	greg@richardsonadams.com
1	greg.bass@calpinesolutions.com
12	
	Holly L. Buchanan
13	139 Barnes Dr., Suite 1
14	Tyndall AFB FL 32403
	Holly.buchanan.1@us.af.mil
15	Jason Y. Moyes
16	Moyes Sellers & Hendricks
	1850 N. Central Ave., Ste. 1100
17	Phoenix AZ 85004
18	jim@harcuvar.com
	jasonmoyes@law-msh.com
19	jjw@krsaline.com
20	Janes D. Mallia
21	Jason R. Mullis WOOD SMITH BENNING & BERMAN LLP
21	2525 E. Camelback Road, Ste. 450
22	Phoenix AZ 85016
23	greg@richardsonadams.com
	jmullis@wshblaw.com
24	greg.bass@calpinesolutions.com
25	75

1	John B. Coffman
2	JOHN B. COFFMAN LLC
3	871 Tuxedo Blvd. St. Louis MO 63119
	john@johncoffman.net
4	I I C T
5	John S. Thornton 8008 N. Invergordon Rd.
6	Paradise Valley AZ 85253
7	john@thorntonfinancial.org
8	Jonathan Jones
9	14324 N 160th Dr.
	Surprise AZ 85379
10	jones.2792@gmail.com
11	Karen S White
12	AFIMSC/JAQ
, ,	139 Barnes Ave. Tyndall AFB FL 32403
13	karen.white.13@us.af.mil
14	March William Committee
15	Kimberly A. Dutcher
16	NAVAJO NATION DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
	P.O. Box 2010
17	Window Rock AZ 86515
18	kdutcher@nndoj.org
19	aquinn@nndoj.org
20	Kurt J. Boehm Boehm, Kurtz & Lowry
21	36 E. Seventh St. Suite 1510
22	Cincinnati OH 45202
	jkylercohn@BKLlawfirm.com
23	kboehm@bkllawfirm.com
24	

- ^ ^ (2) ^=() 전에는 경우 경우 경우의 사용하는 경우 전에 보냈다고
AFLOA/JACE-ULFSC
139 Barnes Dr., Suite 1
Tyndall AFB FL 32403-5317 scott.kirk.2@us.af.mil
scott.kirk.2@us.ar.iiii
Marta Darby
Earthjustuce 633 17th Street Suite 1600
Denver CO 80202
mdarby@earthjustice.org
M.E. M.K
Melissa M. Krueger Pinnacle West Capital Corporation
400 North 5th Street, MS 8695
Phoenix AZ 85004
Andrew.Schroeder@aps.com
rodney.ross@aps.com Thomas.Mumaw@pinnaclewest.com
Theresa.Dwyer@pinnaclewest.com
ratecase@aps.com
Leland.Snook@aps.com
Melissa.Krueger@pinnaclewest.com
Nicholas J. Enoch
LUBIN & ENOCH, PC
349 N. Fourth Ave.
Phoenix AZ 85003
bruce@lubinandenoch.com clara@lubinandenoch.com
nick@lubinandenoch.com
Patricia Madison
13345 W. Evans Drive
Surprise AZ 85379
Patricia_57@q.com

1	Patrick J. Black
2	FENNEMORE CRAIG, P.C.
	2394 E. Camelback Rd. Suite 600
3	Phoenix AZ 85016
4	lferrigni@fclaw.com
	pblack@fclaw.com
5	Richard Gayer
6	526 W. Wilshire Dr.
18.04	Phoenix AZ 85003
7	rgayer@cox.net
8	
9	Robert A Miller
9	12817 W. Ballad Drive
10	Sun City West AZ 85378-5375
11	rdjscw@gmail.com
11	Bob.miller@porascw.org
12	Robin Mitchell
13	Arizona Corporation Commission Director &
	Chief Counsel - Legal Division
14	1200 West Washington St.
15	Phoenix AZ 85007
1 1 1000,000	legaldiv@azcc.gov
16	utildivservicebyemail@azcc.gov
17	Coott C Websfield
1.0	Scott S. Wakefield HIENTON CURRY, P.L.L.C.
18	5045 N 12th Street, Suite 110
19	Phoenix AZ 85014-3302
20	Stephen.Chriss@walmart.com
20	swakefield@hclawgroup.com
21	
22	Shelly A. Kaner
0327-820	8831 W. Athens St.
23	Peoria AZ 85382
24	
25	
	I and the second

1	Thomas Harris Distributed Energy Resource
2	Association (DERA)
1.500	5215 E. Orchid Ln Paradise Valley AZ 85253
3	Thomas.Harris@DERA-AZ.org
4	Thomas.rams e BERT Tresorg
5	Thomas A. Jernigan
	AFIMSC/JAU
6	139 Barnes Drive, Suite 1
7	Tyndall AFB FL 32403-5317
8	thomas.jernigan.3@us.af.mil
	Timothy M. Hogan
9	ARIZONA CENTER FOR LAW IN THE
10	PUBLIC INTEREST
A2-23	514 W. Roosevelt St.
11	Phoenix AZ 85003
12	louisa.eberle@sierraclub.org
13	miriam.raffel-smith@sierraclub.org rose.monahan@sierraclub.org
15	cpotter@swenergy.org
14	czwick@wildfireaz.org
15	briana@votesolar.org
10004	brendon@gabelassociates.com
16	Sandy.bahr@sierraclub.org
17	ezuckerman@swenergy.org janderson@aclpi.org
18	sbatten@aclpi.org
10	thogan@aclpi.org
19	
20	
	D. MI
21	By: <u>ML</u>
22	
23	
24	
25	

BEFORE THE ARIZONA CORPORATION COMMISSION

COMMISSIONERS

BOB BURNS, CHAIRMAN BOYD DUNN SANDRA KENNEDY JUSTIN OLSON LEA MÁRQUEZ PETERSON

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY FOR A HEARING TO DETERMINE THE FAIR VALUE OF THE UTILITY PROPERTY OF THE COMPANY FOR RATEMAKING PURPOSES, TO FIX A JUST AND REASONABLE RATE OF RETURN THEREON, AND TO APPROVE RATE SCHEDULES DESIGNED TO DEVELOP SUCH RETURN.

Docket No. E-01345A-19-0236

Direct Rate Design Testimony of

Brendon J. Baatz

REDACTED VERSION

on behalf of

Southwest Energy Efficiency Project and Western Resource Advocates

October 9, 2020

Table of Contents

I. INTRODUCTION	ON	3
	THREE-PART RATES ARE NOT IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND SHOULD BE CUSTOMERS AND PHASED OUT	RATES ARE NOT IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND SHOULD BE ND PHASED OUT
	UPDATE TOU RATES TO IMPROVE CUSTOMER RESPONSE AND MAXIMIZE	3
	MAKE THE TOU-E RATE OPTION THE DEFAULT RATE FOR ALL NEW RESIDENTIAL	3
HOUR WINDOW	TIME WINDOW SHOULD BE REDUCED TO THREE HOURS INSTEAD OF THE CURRENT FIVE1	7
	INCLUDE A SUPER OFF-PEAK PERIOD IN SUMMER MONTHS AND EVENING SUPER OFF-PEAK MONTHS FOR RATE SCHEDULE TOU-E TO ENCOURAGE MANAGED EV CHARGING2	2
	POSED INCREASE TO THE BSC IS NOT COST BASED OR IN THE PUBLIC	7
	SCRIPTION RATE PILOT PROPOSAL IS NOT IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND	7
V. THE COMMIS	SION SHOULD AUTHORIZE APS TO COLLECT \$65 MILLION ANNUALLY IN	
	BE ALLOWED TO EARN A RETURN ON ENERGY EFFICIENCY INVESTMENTS	E8 .13 .13 .17 .22 .27 .37 .41 .51 .54 .55 .57 .58
VII. THE COMM	IISSION SHOULD REQUIRE APS TO RESET THE LFCR AND ESTABLISH AN	0
	IISSION SHOULD CONSIDER A PBR FRAMEWORK FOR APS5	
D. ILLINOIS	5	1
	TTS5	
	5	
	5	
H. PBR CONCLU	SIONS5	8
IX. CONCLUSION	[6	0
Exhibit List		
Exhibit	Description	
BJB-1	Baatz Resume	
BJB-2	APS Response to SWEEP DR 2.8	
BJB-3 (Highly	APS Response to SWEEP DR 1.11, Arizona Public Service customer	Ī
Confidential)	focus groups to test the communications strategy for the new rates	
BJB-4 (Highly	APS Response to SWEEP DR 1.11, Arizona Public Service customer	Ī
Confidential)	satisfaction study on the prior time-of-use demand rates	
BJB-5	APS Response to SEIA DR 3.11	Ī
BJB-6	APS Response to SEIA DR 3.10	Ī
BJB-7	APS Residential BSC Calculation	Ī
BJB-8	APS Response to SWEEP DR 2.2	Ī
BJB-9	APS Response to SWEEP DR 1.23	7
BJB-10	APS Response to SWEEP DR 1.19	_

I. INTRODUCTION

A.

- 2 Q. Please state your name, business address, and current position.
- A. My name is Brendon J. Baatz. I am currently employed as a Vice President at Gabel Associates, Inc. ("Gabel Associates"), an energy, environmental, and public utility consulting firm. My primary business address is 417 Denison Street, Highland Park, New Jersey 08904. In my current position, I advise clients on a range of electric and natural gas utility regulatory matters.
- 8 Q. Please summarize your professional experience and educational background.
 - I have been employed with Gabel Associates since March 2018. While at Gabel Associates, I have worked for a range of public and private clients on various issues in the utility industry. The issues include retail and wholesale electric rate design, renewable energy project cost benefit analysis, and electric vehicle utility policy. I have also worked extensively on energy efficiency program design, policy, and cost benefit analysis for several clients, including gas and electric utilities.

Prior to my employment with Gabel Associates, I managed the utility program at the American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy ("ACEEE"). There I focused on various issues related to utility-sector energy efficiency programs, including efficiency program design, state policies, and regulatory issues affecting energy efficiency, including electric and gas rate design. While at ACEEE I published numerous reports on energy efficiency programs and policy, and also regularly spoke at conferences on related issues. I also testified in various proceedings on these issues during that time.

Prior to my employment with ACEEE, I was employed with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC"). During my employment with FERC my primary responsibilities were the review and analyses of electric utility cost of service studies in wholesale transmission and electric power rate cases. I also worked on other litigated issues while at FERC including, but not limited to, transmission capacity reservation rights, municipal power contracts, and formula rate structure and protocols. Prior to my employment with FERC, I held positions with the Maryland Public Service Commission ("PSC") as an energy analyst and the Indiana Office of Utility Consumer Counselor ("OUCC") as a utility analyst. While at the Maryland PSC, I worked on the EmPOWER Maryland energy efficiency programs focusing on program design, avoided cost

development, and other policy issues. While working at the OUCC, I testified on a variety of utility issues including, but not limited to, rate design, renewable energy credit compensation, and utility petitions for construction. I also represented the agency in several oversight boards for utility energy efficiency programs.

I hold a Master of Public Affairs degree from Indiana University Bloomington and a Bachelor of Science in political science from Arizona State University. I have continued my education through attendance of various seminars and conferences. I have also completed formal training in rate design, cost of service, depreciation, and other utility regulatory matters.

My resume is attached as Exhibit BJB-1.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

20

21

22

23

24

25

11 Q. Have you previously testified before the Arizona Corporate Commission?

- 12 A. Yes, I previously testified in Docket Nos. E-01933A-15-0322 and E-01933A-19-0028 on 13 rate design issues. I have also testified in Colorado, Oklahoma, New Jersey, Indiana, 14 Pennsylvania, and in Washington, D.C. before FERC.
- 15 Q. Please describe the organizations on whose behalf you are testifying.
- 16 A. The Southwest Energy Efficiency Project ("SWEEP") is a public interest organization 17 dedicated to advancing energy efficiency as a means of promoting customer benefits, 18 economic prosperity, and environmental protection in the six states of Arizona, Colorado, 19 Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming.

Western Resource Advocates ("WRA") is a non-profit conservation organization working to protect and restore the natural environment of the Interior American West. WRA's Clean Energy Program works to develop and implement policies to reduce the environmental impacts of the electric power industry by promoting the expanded use of renewable energy, energy efficiency, and other clean energy resources in an economically sound manner.

Q. Have you reviewed the relevant documents filed by Arizona Public Service in this case?

A. Yes, I have reviewed Arizona Public Service Company's ("APS" or "Company")
application and supporting testimony in this case. I have also reviewed relevant discovery
responses.

- 1 Q. Please state the purpose of your rate design testimony.
- 2 A. The purpose of my rate design testimony is to offer recommendations to the Arizona
- 3 Corporation Commission ("ACC" or "Commission") in several areas, including:
- 4 1. Three-part rates for residential customers;
 - 2. Basic service charges ("BSC") for residential and small general service customers;
- 6 3. Time of use ("TOU") rate design;

11

16

17

18

19

20

- 7 4. The subscription pricing pilot proposal;
- 5. Electric vehicle ("EV") charging rates for residential customers;
- 9 6. Cost recovery for energy efficiency spending;
- 7. Amortization and return on investment for energy efficiency spending;
 - 8. The lost fixed cost recovery ("LFCR") mechanism; and
- Performance based regulation ("PBR").
- 13 Q. Please describe your recommendations to the Commission in this case.
- 14 A. I have several key recommendations for the Commission that I will elaborate on in greater
 15 detail throughout my testimony. I recommend the following:
 - 1. The Commission should freeze all residential demand rates (R-2 and R-3) to new customer enrollment and discontinue these rates options. APS has failed to properly educate customers on three-part rates and to prevent further harm, Rates R-2 and R-3 should no longer be available for customer enrollment. Instead, APS should default all new customers to Rate Schedule TOU-E, while also continuing to offer an optional flat rate, regardless of usage.
- 22 2. The Commission should deny APS's request to increase the BSC for residential 23 and general service customers and set the BSC at \$8.03 for all residential rates. 24 APS's proposal to increase the BSC is inappropriate for several reasons. First, APS's 25 proposed BSCs are not cost based. The Company's calculation of the BSC is flawed 26 because it includes many costs that are not customer related. Second, regardless of what the Commission decides is properly a "customer related" cost, increasing the BSC 27 28 should be rejected because such increases will decrease customer control of bills and 29 reduce the customer incentive to engage in energy efficiency and conservation. Finally, increasing the BSC, as a rate design policy, does not align with other state policies 30 enacted to promote energy efficiency and conservation. 31

3. The Commission should require APS to shorten the TOU on-peak window to three hours to improve customer response and better align with current APS customer consumption patterns and cost of service. This recommendation would change the TOU on-peak hours from 3 p.m. through 8 p.m. to 4 p.m. through 7 p.m.

- 4. The Commission should require APS to default all new residential customers to TOU rates. TOU rates provide significant benefits, including peak demand reductions driven through price signals. APS has a significant number of existing customers on TOU rates. Customers understand TOU rates and respond well. Other Arizona utilities, including Tucson Electric Power ("TEP") and UNS Electric, also default all new customers to TOU rates with seemingly high customer satisfaction. Finally, customers should maintain the option to move to a flat rate if the TOU rate is not for them.
- 5. The Commission should order APS to restructure residential EV rates to provide price signals that encourage off-peak charging by adding a night super off-peak period during the summer and winter months. A super off-peak period would incentivize customers to charge at times when the APS system has excess capacity and would likely avoid investments in new infrastructure to meet growing peak loads driven by EVs.
- 6. The Commission should order APS to recover \$65 million of energy efficiency program costs in base rates. Recovery of energy efficiency program costs in base rates provides certainty in funding moving forward and provides transparency regarding the ratepayer costs of all energy resources in a consistent manner.
- 7. The Commission should allow APS to book energy efficiency program costs as a regulatory asset, amortize these costs over a seven-year period, and earn a return on these investments. Energy efficiency investments should be as financially attractive to APS as other utility investments in infrastructure or generation. Amortizing these costs reduces rate impacts of programs and aligns the cost recovery approach with the timing of the benefits.
- 8. The Commission should reject the APS proposal to keep some costs in the LFCR and should reset the adjustor to zero. Resetting the LFCR to zero in every rate case is standard practice for lost revenue recovery mechanisms. Leaving some costs in the adjustor could lead to overcollection of costs because the billing determinants are reset

based on sales from the test year, which should include the "lost" sales intended to be collected in the LFCR.

- 9. The Commission should require APS to submit documentation of actual lost revenue through an earnings test in order to collect any revenue through the LFCR. APS does not currently have full revenue decoupling in place. The LFCR is intended to collect lost revenues from distributed generation and energy efficiency; however, the current adjustor still collects the lost revenue, regardless of whether or not the Company is already recovering its authorized revenues. This practice is ripe for over recovery and APS should be required to submit an earnings test in order to receive any lost revenues through the LFCR.
- 10. The Commission should reject the APS proposal to conduct a subscription pricing pilot. Subscription pricing is a slightly altered form of an old idea known as a fixed bill. A fixed bill does not provide customers any actionable price signal and discourages any incentive to engage in energy efficiency or install distributed generation. A fixed bill is not a cost-based approach to billing customers for electricity consumption and will lead to increases in peak demand and overall consumption. Furthermore, now is not the time for APS to conduct experiments with its customers given its recent history with customer satisfaction and its failures to properly educate customers about its rate options. If customers are interested in stabilizing their electric bills over the course of a year, budget billing is available.
- 11. The Commission should initiate the already opened statewide generic investigation into PBR to improve utility business models in Arizona by providing revenue opportunities to utilities to meet specific performance metrics and goals. PBR would tie APS' financial earnings with performance in critical areas, including customer satisfaction, reliability, and environmental performance. PBR can allow the Commission to promote critical performance and policy goals by using financial incentives, similar to the energy efficiency performance structure in place now.

¹ See Docket No. E-00000A-20-0019. edocket.azcc.gov/Docket/DocketDetailSearch?docketId=24146#docket-detail-container1

1 I. RESIDENTIAL THREE-PART RATES ARE NOT IN THE 2 PUBLIC INTEREST AND SHOULD BE FROZEN TO NEW 3 CUSTOMERS AND PHASED OUT

- 4 Q. Please summarize the APS proposal for residential three-part rates in this case.
- APS is proposing changes to its existing three-part rate options for residential customers, which include Saver Choice Plus (R-2) and Saver Choice Max (R-3). These changes include an increase in the BSC by 2.4%, the addition of a winter super off-peak TOU window, and small increases to energy/demand rates based on proposed increases to retail revenues.² Both rate options, Saver Choice Plus and Saver Choice Max, were newly implemented rates following the approval of APS' last rate case in 2017.
- Q. Please provide background on the approval and implementation of the Saver Choice
 Plus and Saver Choice Max rate options.
 - The two residential demand charge rate options were approved in the most recent APS rate case in August 2017 in Decision No. 76295,³ which ratified the settlement on many issues reached by APS and the majority of the intervenors. As part of the approved settlement agreement, APS agreed to develop and file an education and outreach plan for new rate options. The stated intention of this plan was to educate and help customers manage their new rate options, including services and tools to help customers manage utility costs.⁴

Following the implementation of the new rates, which were a significant departure from most of APS' prior rate plans, APS and the Commission received numerous complaints regarding rate increase notices, customers' lack of understanding of the "modernized" rate designs, and concerns about being placed on demand rates. The volume of customer complaints was so significant that the Commission opened an investigation into the effectiveness of APS' Customer Outreach and Education Plan ("COEP"). As part of this process, Commission Staff commissioned an independent review of the APS COEP. APS also experienced a substantial increase in late payments and customer defaults following the new rates' implementation, further highlighting significant issues with customer understanding and response to the new rates.

A.

² Hobbick Direct at page 3.

³ Arizona Corporate Commission, Decision No. 76295 in Docket No. E-01345A-16-0036.

⁴ *Ibid.* Settlement Agreement Section 27.1, page 24.

⁵ Arizona Corporate Commission, Decision No. 77270 in Docket No. E-01345A-19-0003.

Q. Please summarize the key findings of the independent review of the APS COEP.

- A. The ACC Staff released the evaluation of the COEP on May 19, 2020. The report was completed by independent consultant Barbara Alexander ("Alexander Report"). A summary review of the report's findings showed:⁶
 - The majority of information communicated to customers in APS' COEP was <u>not</u> reasonable and understandable.
 - Some customers may have been dissatisfied with being moved to new, sometimes
 differently structured rate plans and rate plans with different peak hours than
 previous rate plans.
 - Some customers moved to new rate plans may have experienced or perceived that the rate plans caused significant increases in their bills.
 - Some customers were unhappy with being placed on rate plans with a demand component.
 - The information provided by APS in its rate increase notices and personalized letters failed to convey certain important information, including that these additional increases in bills were dependent on customer-specific circumstances, including the specific rate plans that customers were on before and after the transition, and behavioral changes in energy usage patterns under the new rate plans which could minimize bill increases, such as shifting usage to accommodate the new on-peak hours and demand charges.

These findings suggest a failure on the part of APS to properly educate and inform customers of the new rate options.

Q. Are there other indications of an APS failure to properly educate and inform customers on the new rate options approved in its last rate case?

A. Yes, there are several other indicators of an APS failure to educate customers on the new rate options that were approved in its last rate case. In early 2019, the ACC directed its Staff to initiate a rate review of APS's current rates to determine if the Company had been over earning.⁷ The rate review found that the design of the Company's new rate plans may have incentivized the selection of demand rates over other options. The review also found

The state of

⁶ Ibid. pages 3-5.

⁷ ACC Utilities Division Staff, Request for a New Docket. January 9, 2019. Docket No. E-01345A-19-0003. docket.images.azcc.gov/0000195010.pdf

that APS had been over earning, collecting \$6.7 million of gross margin in 2018 associated with higher than expected revenues due to variances between assumptions in the billing determinants used in the 2016 rate case and actual 2018 billing determinants.⁸

4 Q. Please expand on other indicators of the APS failure to properly roll out the new rates.

A. The number of defaults and late payments also increased following the implementation of the new rates. Table 1 shows the number of residential customer late payments and defaults by year from 2016 through 2018. As the data show, the number of late payments increased by 47% from 2016 to 2018. The number of defaults nearly doubled from 2017 to 2018.

Table 1. APS Residential Late Payments and Defaults 2016-2018

Year	# of Late Payments	# of Defaults
2016	1,113,755	85,433
2017	1,595,102	55,303
2018	1,640,500	105,206

11

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

10

Q. Would you expect an increase in the number of defaults and late payments during this time period in the absence of the APS rate design changes?

A. No, I would not. The APS service territory was experiencing economic growth during this period. Using data from the United States Census, I reviewed the population living below the poverty level for all counties in the APS service territory (Apache, Cochise, Coconino, Maricopa, Navajo, Pinal, Yavapai, and Yuma). The results showed that from 2015-2018 the population living below the poverty level declined by 17%. Table 2 shows this data.

Table 2. Population Below Poverty Line in APS Service Territory Counties 2015-2018. 10

	2015	2016	2017	2018
Population below poverty level	934,935	922,735	893,190	861,357
% of population below poverty level	17.9%	17.4%	16.6%	15.6%

The significant increase in the number of residential late payments and defaults during a period of economic growth is unexpected and is likely explained by the rate changes and

⁸ Arizona Corporate Commission, Decision No. 77270 in Docket No. E-01345A-19-0003, page 7.

⁹ See Exhibit BJB-2 APS Response to SWEEP 2.8.

¹⁰ U.S. Census Bureau, 2009-2014 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates. data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=United%20States&tid=ACSDP1Y2019.DP05&hidePreview=false

implementation of new rate options for customers. In an environment of increased prosperity and favorable economic conditions, you would expect the number of late payments and defaults to decrease, not increase.

4 Q. Were there other issues with the APS roll out of its new rates?

Yes. As part of its rate rollout and COEP, the Company developed a rate comparison tool that would allow customers to determine the best rate option based on their prior consumption patterns. The tool developed by APS included flaws that gave customers inaccurate results, leading some customers to subscribe to rates that were not in their best interest. These customers ended up facing higher bills than needed because of the flawed tool.

11 Q. In your opinion, do you think the rate plan names contributed to customer confusion?

13 A. Yes, I think it is likely the rate plan names confused customers. The two demand rate plan
14 names, Saver Choice Plus and Saver Choice Max, imply that a customer would have a
15 lower bill than the TOU-E rate (Saver Choice) and the flat rate plans, Lite Choice and
16 Premier Choice. The names also do not indicate a difference between a flat rate, TOU rate,
17 or demand rate plan.

18 Q. Regarding the APS COEP, did you find any other aspects problematic in terms of potential for customer confusion?

A. Yes. In the Final COEP, APS stated that it "will focus its education plan on notifying customers of their Best Rate, a plan that provides them the lowest electricity bill based on the most recent year of their own usage data." As noted in the Alexander Report, APS usually promoted the demand rate options as the "best plan" for customers. This is problematic for several reasons. One, APS's own rate analysis tool was flawed and incorrectly predicted a customer's "best plan." This created customer confusion and harmed some customers.

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

¹¹ Arizona Public Service. Final Customer Education and Outreach Plan. September 29, 2017. E-01345A-16-0036 and E-01345A-16-0123. Page 2. docket.images.azcc.gov/0000182982.pdf

¹² Alexander, B. "An Evaluation of Arizona Public Service Company's Customer Education Plan and It's Implementation." May 19, 2020. Prepared on Behalf of the Staff of the Arizona Corporation Commission. Page 25. docket.images.azcc.gov/E000006584.pdf

¹³ Ibid. page 9.

1 Two, APS's customers did not understand demand rates prior to the roll out of the new rate plans. 10 Three, telling customers a demand rate plan is the "best rate" for them because of 11 12 twelve months of prior consumption is misleading. Under a demand rate, it is very easy to incur a large demand charge if you are not mindful of which appliances and devices are 13 14 running at one time, leading to a much higher bill. As previously stated, most customers were not familiar with a demand rate concept and 16 ■. Therefore, telling these customers that a demand rate option is the "best plan" for them and not providing the tools customers needed to respond to different rates 17 18 is problematic. 19 What conclusions do you draw from the large increase in customer complaints Q. related to rates, the customer education failures documented in the Alexander 20 Report, the spike in late payments and defaults, and the documented over recovery 21 of revenues shown in the Staff Report? 22 23 The evidence indicates a substantial failure on the part of APS to properly roll out the new A. 24 rates from the 2016 rate case. Customers clearly did not understand the new rates and did 25 not respond in a meaningful way. As a result, many customers faced higher than expected 26 bills and APS accrued higher than expected earnings. The significant increase in late payments and customer defaults is also clear evidence of a failure on APS's part to educate 27 28 customers. 29 Q. Do have specific recommendations for the Saver Choice Plus and Saver Choice Max 30 rate options?

¹⁴ See Exhibit BJB-3 (Highly Confidential) APS Response to SWEEP DR 1.11.

¹⁵ See Exhibit BJB-4 (Highly Confidential) APS Response to SWEEP DR 1.11.

1 A. Yes. I recommend the Commission discontinue these rates for new customers and phase 2 out existing customers over time. I am not recommending APS remove all customers from 3 these rate options at this time, but both R-2 and R-3 options should be frozen so no other 4 customers can be added to these rate plans. There are several reasons why I am recommending APS discontinue the residential three-part rate options. APS has failed to 5 6 properly educate customers on the new rate options. Demand charges are a poor price 7 signal to residential customers as to when and how to use electricity in a way that benefits 8 the system as a whole. Finally, three-part rates for residential customers are inferior to other 9 time-based rate options, including TOU rates, in many respects. Properly designed TOU 10 rates are better understood by customers, elicit a more significant price response, and are 11 already familiar to APS customers.

II. APS SHOULD UPDATE TOU RATES TO IMPROVE CUSTOMER RESPONSE AND MAXIMIZE SYSTEM BENEFITS

14 Q. Please describe the APS proposal regarding TOU in this proceeding.

12

13

21

22

23

24

25

26

28

- 15 A. The Company is proposing to increase the BSC and add a winter super off-peak period to demand TOU rates (R-2 and R-3). The super off-peak period would be 10 a.m. to 3 p.m. during winter months only.
- 18 Q. Please summarize your recommendations regarding the APS Residential TOU rates.
- A. In order to maximize benefits of TOU rates and customer satisfaction, I offer the following
 recommendations:
 - APS should make the TOU-E rate option the default rate for all new residential customers;
 - 2. The on-peak time window should be reduced to three hours instead of the current five-hour window; and
 - 3. A super off-peak period should be added for EV customers to incentivize customers to charge during super off-peak hours.
- I elaborate on each of these recommendations below.
 - a. APS Should Make the TOU-E Rate Option the Default Rate for All New Residential Customers.
- 30 Q. What is the current default rate for APS residential customers?

1 A. Currently, APS has no default rate option for residential customers. According to the 2 Company, when a new customer initiates new service over the phone, an APS customer 3 service representative will work with the customer to determine the "best" rate option. 16 4 As the past several years have shown, APS has a poor track record of choosing rate options 5 for customers. TOU rates also are the best rate option offered by APS for reducing customer 6 peak demand. Finally, APS's (and other Arizona utilities') customers have had a generally 7 positive experience on TOU rates. For these reasons, APS should default all new customers 8 on TOU-E, while still allowing customers an opportunity to switch to a flat rate option, 9 because TOU rates are not the best option for all customers.

10 Q. Do other utilities in Arizona default new customers to TOU rates?

11 A. Yes. I am aware of UNS Electric and Tucson Electric Power. For UNS Electric, the
12 Commission required a two-part TOU rate to be the default rate for new customers in
13 August 2016.¹⁷ For TEP, the Commission approved TOU as the default option for
14 residential customers in February 2017.¹⁸ By adopting TOU as the default rate option for
15 new residential customers, APS would be consistent with other investor owned utilities in
16 Arizona.

17 Q. What are the benefits of defaulting new customers to TOU rates?

A. When designed properly, TOU rates have the ability to produce substantial peak demand reductions. These peak demand reductions lower system costs by avoiding the need to construct new generation, transmission, and distribution infrastructure. TOU rates also give customers more control over their electric bills and may have less harmful impacts on low income customers when compared with a simple two-part rate with a high BSC. TOU rates also offer the Company a reasonable opportunity to recover Commission authorized costs.

Q. Do customers understand and respond well to TOU rates?

25 A. Yes, previous studies have shown that customers do understand and respond well to TOU
26 rates. A recent series of studies was conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy under
27 the Smart Grid Investment Grant Program. Ten utilities conducted 11 consumer behavior
28 studies to better understand customer acceptance, retention, and response to time varying

¹⁶ APS response to Staff DR 8.3.

¹⁷ Arizona Corporate Commission, Decision No. 75697, Docket No. E-04204A-15-0142.

¹⁸ Arizona Corporate Commission, Decision No. 75975, Docket No. E-01933A-15-0322.

rates.¹⁹ The studies were done over a period of several years under rigorous scientific research protocols. Major findings included the following:

A.

- Opt out approaches (defaulting customers onto specific rates) were more cost effective than opt in.
- A majority of customers defaulted onto TOU rates at Sacramento Municipal Utility District ("SMUD") were satisfied with the TOU rate based on customer surveys.
- Customer technologies such as programable thermostats produced higher peak demand reductions for time varying rates.
- Peak demand reductions were higher for rate designs with higher peak to off-peak ratios on average.

Q. Please describe the potential peak demand reductions TOU rates may provide.

TOU rates can substantially reduce peak demands. A report by the Rocky Mountain Institute noted that well-designed time-based rates (including TOU, critical peak pricing, or peak time rebates) "are effective at achieving their objective of providing a price signal to customers about when to use energy." This same report noted that several regions are transitioning to default TOU rates because of this effectiveness.


According to a 2013 article by Dr. Ahmad Faruqui, TOU pricing yields significant load reductions. ²¹ In the study, Dr. Faruqui reviewed 34 pricing studies, under which 163 experimental treatments were conducted. The pricing pilots evaluated customer response to several forms of dynamic pricing including: TOU, peak time rebates, variable peak pricing, and critical peak pricing. Some of the pricing experiences also included a technology intervention, like an in-home energy usage display or home energy monitor that provides feedback on energy consumption. Figure 1 below shows the percentage of peak demand reduction achieved for all 163 pricing pilots sorted by rate option. As the figure shows, TOU pricing produced substantial peak demand reductions – with many peak reductions from TOU pricing producing peak reductions in the 10% - 40% range.

²⁰ Rocky Mountain Institute. 2016. "A Review of Alternative Rate Designs: Industry Experience with Time-Based and Demand Charge Rates for Mass-Market Customers." rmi.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/A-Review-of-Alternative-Rate-Designs-2016.pdf

¹⁹ United States Department of Energy. 2016. Customer Acceptance, Retention, and Response to Time-Based Rates from the Consumer Behavior Studies. Smart Grid Investment Grant Program.

energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/06/f24/ARRA-CBS interim program impact report June2015.pdf

²¹ Faruqui, A. and S. Sergici. 2013. "Arcturus: International Evidence on Dynamic Pricing." The Electricity Journal. Volume 26, Issue 7, August/September. sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1040619013001656



Note: TOU = time of use, PTR = peak time rebate, VPP = variable peak pricing, CPP = critical peak
 pricing.

Q. Please identify the benefits of expanding the number of customers on TOU rates.

A. There are many benefits to implementing and expanding utilization of TOU rates. The potential benefits from load shifting and conservation in response to TOU include lower customer bills; reduced wholesale market prices; avoided or deferred capacity investments in generation, transmission, and distribution; better integration of intermittent renewable energy resources; and, potentially, reduced pollution. TOU rates may also provide higher returns on investment in distributed energy resources, such as solar energy and energy storage, as well as energy efficient appliances.

Q. Please expand upon how TOU rates assist in providing the benefits discussed above.

13 A. TOU rates produce several significant benefits. These benefits include:

²² Ibid.

1. Lower customer bills - Under flat pricing, customers pay the same rate for electricity during all hours of the day. As a consequence, customers have no knowledge of actual prices across the hours of the day and, therefore, use electricity without considering the economics of the product that they are purchasing. TOU rates provide customers with appropriate price signals to allow them to modify their electricity usage patterns to use electricity more efficiently. As such, TOU rates allow customers to reduce their utility bills by shifting usage to the less costly periods through heightened price sensitivity.

- 2. Reduced wholesale prices The benefits of TOU rates can reach all market participants, creating a more efficient and less costly system. Reduced peak demand and lower levels of congestion can help avert calling on more expensive power generation, allowing wholesale markets to clear at lower prices. Avoiding the dispatch of higher priced generation results in a lower average cost of producing electricity and thus a lower price for those who choose to remain on flat pricing.
- Avoided or deferred capacity investments To the extent that TOU rates are able to
 mitigate system wide peak demand by shifting energy consumption to off-peak times,
 the need for additional power plants and transmission and distribution infrastructure can
 be deferred or avoided.
- 4. Better integration of intermittent renewable energy resources TOU rates can integrate and help drive the deployment of distributed energy resources, such as solar photovoltaics (PV), storage, and energy efficiency. TOU rates can also help align energy demand with the growing penetration of distributed energy resource supply, leading to a more efficient management of the electric system and increased utilization of renewable resources, which should reduce fossil-based air emissions.
- 5. <u>Improved environmental outcomes</u> TOU rates encourage conservation and shifting of electricity consumption to times when electricity is cheaper, behaviors that are further enhanced by stimulating investments in energy efficiency and battery storage. Load shifting from on-peak to off-peak periods and reduced overall load from conservation can result in a decrease of polluting emissions from the power sector.

b. The On-peak Time Window Should Be Reduced to Three Hours Instead of The Current Five-Hour Window

Q. What is the APS proposed TOU window for residential rates?

A. According to the filed proposed Rate Schedule TOU-E, the on-peak time period is 3 to 8 p.m., Monday through Friday year round. The rate also includes a super off-peak period in the winter months (November through April) from 10 a.m. to 3 p.m. All other hours are off-peak.

5 Q. What are the general objectives of TOU rates?

A.

A.

The general purpose of TOU rates is to reduce demand during peak periods or encourage consumption in off-peak periods. This objective is accomplished by providing a pricing signal directly to customers that discourages consumption during specified hours via a higher price. By reducing peak demand, cost – both present and future – can be decreased.

Generation costs are reduced by avoiding the dispatch of higher priced supply. Peak load reductions generally do not lower current distribution costs because the majority of these costs are fixed in the short-run. However, future generation and distribution costs can be avoided through reducing peak loads because all utility system costs are variable in the long-run. For example, reductions in peak demand, including noncoincident peak demand at the class level, allow utilities to avoid making additional investments in new infrastructure to meet growing demand. Because these investment decisions are made prior to the actual real-time delivery of energy, they cannot be changed in the short term but can be changed long-run.

The establishment of on and off-peak periods considers several variables including: system and class hourly loads, hourly cost of service considerations, and customer comprehension, ability, and willingness to respond. There are often tradeoffs in designing TOU rates. For example, a TOU rate will often include the same on-peak periods for summer and winter, even if the customer demand and system costs are significantly lower in the winter. This is to simplify the rate for customer understanding and communication. The balancing of objectives also may result in a TOU rate that is not completely cost based, but still achieves its stated targets.

Q. Do you support the on-peak period as proposed by APS?

No. The on-peak period is too long and is not based on current information. APS developed the on-peak period using forecasted system summer peak hours, not the actual residential customer class summer peak. The Company also relied on forecasted system costs to

develop the on-peak period instead of actual costs, which I believe is a flawed approach.²³ I recommend APS use an on-peak window of 4 to 7 p.m., Monday through Friday year round. This time window allows customers enhanced opportunity to respond to the rate and is better aligned with the residential customer class summer peak and cost of service.

Q. Please describe the basis for your recommendation for a shorter on-peak window.

The current (and proposed) on-peak window of 3 to 8 p.m. covers a five-hour period, which is excessively long for customers to adequately respond. A shorter window would allow customers greater flexibility in changing behaviors to shift demand to off-peak hours. A shorter window would also allow customers a greater opportunity to pre-cool homes, which is more challenging under a five hour on-peak window.

Q. Did specific APS data also inform your recommendation?

A.

A.

Yes. I reviewed the residential summer hourly consumption for non-solar customers in calendar year 2019. Figure 2 shows the hourly load for weekdays during the summer months.




Figure 2. APS 2019 Summer Weekday Residential Gross Hourly Load. 24

The hours shaded in gray are the current APS TOU-E on-peak hours. As the chart shows, the three highest hours of consumption for the residential customer class are from 4 to 7

²³ Miessner Settlement Rebuttal Testimony, Docket Nos. E-01345A-16-0036 & E-01345A-16-0123.

²⁴ See Exhibit BJB-5 APS Response to SEIA 3.11.

p.m. (shown in Figure 2 as hours ending 17, 18, and 19). The APS proposal includes additional hours, including 7 to 8 p.m. (hour ending 20), which is not even the fifth highest hour during this period.

4 Q. APS proposes using the system hourly load to design residential TOU rates instead of the residential class hourly load. Please respond.

APS argued in its prior rate case that the residential TOU on-peak periods should be based on system load, not residential class load. ²⁵ However, this recommendation was also based on a forecast. Figure 3 shows the APS summer weekday gross system load for 2019. The hours shaded in gray are the current TOU-E on-peak hours. As the figure shows, the current on-peak periods are not supported by current customer conditions. The 2019 gross weekday hourly system load supports an on-peak period that occurs earlier in the day, which would also facilitate a better price response from residential customers.




Figure 3. APS Hourly Summer Weekday Gross System Load.²⁶

Q. You previously mentioned APS relied on forecasted cost data to develop TOU onpeak periods. Please expand.

A. In Settlement Rebuttal testimony, APS witness Charles Miessner outlined the Company's justification for choosing the 3 to 8 p.m. on-peak window.²⁷ Mr. Miessner references an

A.

²⁵ Miessner Settlement Rebuttal Testimony, Docket Nos. E-01345A-16-0036 & E-01345A-16-0123.

²⁶ See Exhibit BJB-6, APS Response to SEIA 3.10.

²⁷ Miessner Settlement Rebuttal Testimony, Docket Nos. E-01345A-16-0036 & E-01345A-16-0123.

energy and capacity cost heat map to support his position. The "heat map" was based on levelized costs from 2020 to 2035, meaning the Company based rates filed in 2016 on forecasted costs from 2020 to 2035 for energy and capacity. A significant portion of the on-peak costs are driven by forecasted costs to install a combustion turbine in 2026.


Q. Do you think this is a reasonable approach?

A. No, I do not. It is unreasonable and problematic for APS to design rates based on forecasted system conditions ten years into the future. The cost assumptions from APS are also outdated, unreliable, and should be rejected by the Commission as a basis for designing current rates.

Q. How has APS performed in forecasting future load?

A. APS has a poor record of load forecasting. Figure 4 shows APS load forecasts compared with actual load. As the figure shows, APS has significantly overestimated peak load.

Figure 4. APS Load Forecasts versus Actual Load. Source: Pinnacle West Annual Reports, Statistical Report Supplements, and Load Forecasts.



- Q. Please summarize your recommendations to the Commission on the issue of on-peak hours for the TOU-E rate.
- A. I recommend the Commission adopt an on-peak period of 4 to 7 p.m. based on the current system conditions. If conditions change that require a redesign of the TOU-E rate, APS should file the requested changes at that time based on actual and current information.
 - c. APS Should Include a Super Off-peak Period in Summer Months and Evening Super Off-peak Period in Winter Months for Rate Schedule TOU-E to Encourage Managed EV Charging
- 9 Q. Does APS currently offer a residential rate option specifically targeted to EV owners?

7

- 11 A. No. APS does not currently offer a residential rate option specifically tailored for residential customers with EVs. The APS TOU-E rate includes off-peak periods in summer and winter, and a super off-peak period from 10 a.m. to 3 p.m. in the winter months. The price differentials of these rate options, the price difference between the on and off-peak periods, are sufficient to drive customer behavior change. However, there is currently no super off-peak period defined for the summer months on the TOU-E rate.
- 17 Q. Why should APS add a super off-peak period in the summer months?
- A. A nighttime super off-peak period would offer customers a lower rate during those hours to encourage charging during super off-peak periods when system utilization is lowest. This approach would reduce charging during higher utilization hours, lowering demand on the distribution system and avoiding the need to build new capacity. The current TEP super off-peak period for its residential TOU-EV rate option is from 10 p.m. to 5 a.m. in all months of the year. Sieven the residential hourly load shape shown in Figure 2, a period of 11 p.m. to 5 a.m. for APS customers would be reasonable.
- Q. Why should APS add an additional super off-peak period at night in the winter months?
- A. The addition of a super off-peak period at nighttime for winter months would encourage charging during super off-peak periods when system utilization is lowest. A nighttime super off-peak period would also be consistent with the summer month recommendation above, which would allow consistent messaging to customers about when to charge. I am

²⁸ Tucson Electric Power. Super Off-Peak Time-of-Use EV Plan. <u>tep.com/electric-vehicles/super-off-peak-time-of-use-ev-plan/</u>

not proposing that APS eliminate the 10 a.m. to 3 p.m. super off-peak period in winter months at this time.

3 Q. Why is it important for APS to manage EV charging through rate design?

A. The rise of EVs has the potential to be one of the most significant changes to take place in the electricity sector over the coming decades. For instance, the combination of policy support for transportation electrification and the rapid decline in costs of batteries have led almost all major manufacturers in the automobile industry to make significant investments in electric vehicles.

The proliferation of EVs over the next decade will significantly increase electric demand in the APS service territory. The increased demand, if not properly planned for and managed, will require expansion of distribution infrastructure, which will increase costs for all customers. If APS can plan properly and manage the new demand from EVs, it can reduce future costs by encouraging customers to charge at times where system capacity is ample.

15 Q. Do APS ratepayers stand to benefit from increased EV deployment?

- 16 A. Yes. There are a number of potential benefits, including: improved air quality and public 17 health, reduced consumer fuel costs, and enhanced utilization of the electricity grid and 18 potential to lower electricity rates.
- 19 Q. Please describe each of these benefits in greater detail.
- 20 A. These benefits include:

Reduced emissions and improved public health: Because electric vehicles have no tailpipe emissions, they can deliver significant air quality and public health benefits. As the emissions intensity of electricity production decreases due to higher levels of renewable energy penetration, these benefits will grow. SWEEP conducted an analysis in 2013 of the emissions associated with driving an EV versus a comparable gasoline-fueled vehicle in Maricopa County. This analysis revealed that there are already very significant emissions reductions associated with driving an EV in Arizona. The largest emissions reductions are for Volatile Organic Compounds or VOCs (99% reduction) and carbon monoxide (99% reduction), with significant additional reductions in sulfur dioxide (93% reduction), nitrogen oxides (76% reduction), and particulate matter (60% reduction for PM2.5 and 45%

reduction for PM10). Since VOCs and nitrogen oxides are the major precursors to ozone formation, widespread adoption of EVs could be an important strategy for addressing the region's ozone challenges.²⁹ Further, EVs do not emit carbon dioxide, which accelerates climate change. Climate change poses risks of increased temperatures, drought, and wildfires in Arizona.^{30,31}

- Reduced consumer fuel costs: Because electric motors are much more efficient than internal combustion engines, fuel costs are significantly lower for EVs. The average American household spends \$2,000-\$3,000 on gasoline each year. EV drivers can save between \$700-\$1,400 annually on fuel costs money that consumers can spend directly into the Arizona economy. Depending on EV adoption rates and gasoline prices, the total economic benefit to Arizona in reduced fuel costs could be between \$75-\$489 million per year by 2030. If Arizona were to achieve the level of one million EVs by 2050, this would lead to annual consumer savings of \$700 million-\$1.4 billion. \$2,33
- Enhanced utilization of the electricity grid and potential to lower electricity rates: EVs offer utilities an opportunity to increase the demand for electricity, especially during off-peak hours when there can be significant underutilized electric generating capacity (assuming proper price signals are established). In order to meet peak load demands during summer months, utilities generally have significant amounts of generating capacity that is unused or underutilized during most of the year, especially during the late evening and early morning hours. If underutilized capacity is used more frequently, the fixed capital costs will be spread out over more generation and sales, which can reduce pressure on rates for all customers.

²⁹ SWEEP. 2013. "Air Quality and Economic Benefits of Electric Vehicles in Arizona." swenergy.org/data/sites/1/media/documents/publications/documents/AZ%20EV%20AirQuality.EconAnalysis.9.26.1 3%20.pdf

³⁰ Environmental Protection Agency. 2016. What Climate Change Means for Arizona.

¹⁹january2017snapshot.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-09/documents/climate-change-az.pdf

³¹ Arizona Republic. 2018. Study: Climate change could transform Arizona's forests, deserts, worsening drought and fire. September 1. azcentral.com/story/news/local/arizona-environment/2018/09/01/climate-change-could-transform-arizona-forests-deserts-environment-study/1148294002/

³² Electric Vehicle Cost-Benefit Analysis: Plug-in Electric Vehicle Cost-Benefit Analysis: Arizona. December 2018. mjbradley.com/sites/default/files/AZPEVCBAnalysisFINAL04dec18.pdf

³³ SWEEP. 2019. Electric Vehicles in Arizona: Economic Benefits. swenergy.org/pubs/electric-vehicles-in-arizona-economic-benefits-fact-sheet

Therefore, additional off-peak charging by EVs may help to reduce rates for all utility customers. Managed EV charging may also have the potential to assist in aligning load with solar production, as EVs can be charged during the day (when there is excess solar production). Some EV applications, like electric school buses and managed workplace charging, may be particularly well suited for this purpose.

Q. Has the potential for EVs to lower electricity rates been studied in Arizona?

A.

- Yes. In 2018, SWEEP and WRA engaged M.J. Bradley & Associates to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of increased EV deployment in Arizona. According to that study, managed off-peak charging results in far greater financial savings to ratepayers than baseline charging or unmanaged charging. Indeed, under a high EV adoption scenario with managed off-peak charging, the average Arizona household could realize approximately \$176 in annual utility bill savings in 2050 (nominal dollars) due to managed vehicle electrification. Increased EV deployment will bring other benefits to Arizonans as well including:
 - \$2.6 billion in reduced annual vehicle operating costs;
 - \$300 million in reduced costs of complying with future carbon reduction regulations; and
 - \$70 million in the value of reduced NOx emissions.

This issue has also been studied in a number of states. In each of these examinations, the conclusion has been that there is the potential for significant system-wide benefits from widespread EV adoption. For example, a 2017 study of EV adoption in Colorado by the consulting firm M.J. Bradley & Associates found that for every additional EV added, utility customers in aggregate receive \$630 in benefit and that if Colorado achieves the levels of EV adoption called for in the state EV plan by 2030, utility customers as a whole will see \$50 million a year in electric bill savings due to this downward pressure on rates. A similar analysis in Minnesota found that high levels of EV adoption would exert downward pressure on electric rates, reducing the typical customer bill by \$171 per

³⁴ Electric Vehicle Cost-Benefit Analysis: Plug-in Electric Vehicle Cost-Benefit Analysis: Arizona. December 2018. mjbradley.com/sites/default/files/AZPEVCBAnalysisFINAL04dec18.pdf

³⁵ Electric Vehicle Cost-Benefit Analysis: Plug-in Electric Vehicle Cost-Benefit Analysis: Colorado. April 2017. mjbradley.com/sites/default/files/CO_PEV_CB_Analysis_FINAL_13apr17.pdf

year by 2050.³⁶ An analysis by E3 in Ohio found that each additional EV would bring a ratepayer net benefit of \$1,470 under a high adoption scenario.³⁷

Q. Has the Commission adopted a policy statement on EVs?

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

- A. Yes. In 2019, the Commission approved two EV policy statements.³⁸ These policy statements encourage EV use, innovative rate designs, and charging infrastructure development that will improve air quality, benefit public health, and lower utility bills for all Arizonans. On EV rate design, the Commission policy specifically encourages utilities to:
 - "Develop and propose innovative rate designs and load management strategies applicable to EV charging."
 - "Propose rate design tariffs and load management strategies that incentivize customers to charge vehicles during off-peak hours."
 - "Develop optional rate design tariffs and technology-based load management strategies for workplace, fleet charging, and electrified mass transit that encourage light, medium, and heavy-duty vehicle charging at times that would improve the integration of variable resources and the electric systems operational flexibility."
 - "Propose rate design tariffs and technology-based load management strategies that alleviate or address demand charges and other issues faced when deploying DC fast charging stations."

Q. Please summarize your recommendation related to residential EV rate design.

A. I recommend the ACC require APS to adopt a super off-peak period for the TOU-E rate offering to encourage EV charging during super off-peak periods. Alternatively, APS could also implement a stand-alone rate option for EV customers with a similar design, which would allow the TOU-E rate option to continue as designed.

³⁶ Electric Vehicle Cost-Benefit Analysis: Plug-in Electric Vehicle Cost-Benefit Analysis: Minnesota. July 2018. mjbradley.com/sites/default/files/MN%20PEV%20CB%20Analysis%20FINAL%2015aug18.pdf

³⁷ Cost-Benefit Analysis of Plug-in Electric Vehicle Adoption in the AEP Ohio Service Territory. April 2017. ethree.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/E3-AEP-EV-Final-Report-4 28.pdf

³⁸ Arizona Corporate Commission Staff Policy Statement for Electric Vehicles, Electric Vehicle Infrastructure, and the Electrification of the Transportation Sector in Arizona. January 16, 2019. Docket No. RU-00000A-18-0284, Decision No. 77044. docket.images.azcc.gov/0000195197.pdf; Electric Vehicle Implementation Plan. In the Matter of Possible Modifications to the Arizona Corporate Commission's Energy Rules. July 19. 2019. Docket No. RU-00000A-18-0284, Decision No. 77289. docket.images.azcc.gov/0000199128.pdf

THE APS PROPOSED INCREASE TO THE BSC IS NOT COST III. 1 BASED OR IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 2

3 Q. What is a BSC?

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

A.

4 A. A BSC is a fixed fee on a customer bill that is generally assessed on a monthly basis. It is 5 also known as a customer charge or fixed charge. A BSC is the minimum amount of 6 revenue a utility will recover from a customer, regardless of power consumption.

7 Please describe the APS proposal on the BSC. Q.

For the residential class, APS is proposing an increase in base revenues of \$38.9 million (not including the adjustor transfer), representing a 2.24% increase.³⁹ APS is also proposing an increase to BSCs for all rate schedules. The increase varies by rate class but is approximately a 2.5% increase for all residential and general service rate options, meaning APS is proposing to collect the entirety of its proposed revenue increase through increases to the BSC (the Company will also increase revenue collection in riders for an overall projected net increase of 5.6%). Table 3 shows the current and proposed BSCs for all residential rates, excluding solar options. The residential BSCs vary based on rate schedule.

Table 3. APS Residential Rate Schedule Current and Proposed BSCs

Rate Schedule	Current		Propos	ed	Change (%)
R-XS	\$	9.87	\$	10.11	2.43%
R-Basic	\$	14.79	\$	15.15	2.43%
R-Basic Large	\$	19.74	\$	20.19	2.28%
TOU-E	\$	12.81	\$	13.11	2.34%
R-2	\$	12.81	\$	13.11	2.34%
R-3	\$	12.81	\$	13.11	2.34%
R-Tech	\$	14.79	\$	15.15	2.43%

Does this table show all proposed increases to the BSC? 17 Q.

18 A. No. This table does not include the residential distributed solar rates.

19 O. How does APS justify the proposed increases to the residential BSC?

20 A. In its application, the Company offers no justification for collecting the entire proposed 21 new residential revenue increase in higher BSCs. APS points to additional investments in 22 the Ocotillo Modernization Project, the SCR at Four Corners, low income bill assistance, changes to depreciation rates, and other expenses as the basis for its revenue increase. 40 23

³⁹ Schedule H-1, page 1 of 1.

⁴⁰ Arizona Public Service, Application, Docket No. E-01345A-19-0236, page 2.

1 Q. Do you agree with the APS BSC proposal?

A. No. I disagree with the proposed BSC levels for all residential rates and also with the recovery of all proposed revenue increases through the BSC. None of the proposed revenue increases are customer related costs. The prior calculation of the BSC also included several cost categories that were not customer related costs. A review of the APS approach to cost classification shows the Company is including several categories of costs that should not be classified as customer related or included in the BSC.

8 Q. What categories of costs are generally included in a BSC?

9 A. A BSC should typically only include customer related costs. Customer related costs are 10 generally defined as the "operating and capital costs found to vary with the number of customers regardless, or almost regardless, of power consumption."41 These costs 11 generally include the meter, service drop, and billing and collection costs. Limiting 12 13 customer related costs to the meter, service drop, and billing/collection costs is a cost-based 14 approach that ensures each customer is only charged a monthly fee for the costs they are 15 causing. If costs that are not directly customer related are included and recovered in a BSC, some customers will pay more than the costs they cause while others will pay less. 16

Q. Does APS agree with your definition of customer related costs?

A. Yes. Company witness Snook agrees that customer related costs should be limited to those that vary with the number of customers on the system. In direct testimony, Mr. Snook defined cost classification as "the process of determining the factor or factors that drive the magnitude of the cost." Mr. Snook went on to state that "if a cost is driven by the number of customers taking service on the APS system irrespective of either the kW demand or kWh energy, it is classified as customer."

Q. Is APS including costs in the proposed BSC that are not customer related?

25 A. Yes. I calculated the BSC for the residential class using data from the Company's cost of 26 service study, including the Company's proposed revenue changes and capital structure. 27 My analysis shows the BSC should be \$8.03 per month. Exhibit BJB-7 shows the 28 breakdown of this analysis. A comparison of the Company's cost of service study with my 29 calculation shows the Company is including additional rate base items, which are most

17

⁴¹ Bonbright, James C. 1961. Principles of Public Utility Rates. Columbia University Press. p. 347.

⁴² Snook Direct at page 9, lines 13-21.

likely distribution plant costs in its BSC. The Company is also including additional expenses that are substantially higher than the customer related expenses that are included in my calculation.

4 Q. How is a basic service charged typically developed?

A. A critical component of cost of service ratemaking is the determination of what costs are
"customer related" and should be collected through the BSC. This involves classification
of utility costs by account to either demand, energy, or customer. Costs that are defined as
customer related are classified as customer costs. The sum of all customer related revenue
requirements is then divided by the total number of bills for the test year to develop the
BSC.

11 Q. Do you agree with the inclusion of distribution plant costs in the BSC?

A. The only distribution plant that should be included in a BSC is the cost of meters (FERC account 370) and services (FERC account 369). Services refers to the costs of the service drop or line that goes from the distribution pole to the customer's home. Other utilities in Arizona (TEP and UNS) have proposed collection of other distribution plant costs in the BSC, including costs of shared infrastructure like poles, wires, and transformers. None of these costs vary directly with the number of customers on the system and should not be classified as customer related.

19 Q. Does APS agree?

A. APS agrees that distribution plant costs are generally not customer related. According to Company witness Snook, "distribution plant is generally designed to meet an individual customer class's peak load."⁴⁵

Q. Does the Company's proposed change in the BSC better align rate design with cost causation?

A. No, it does not. The proposed changes to the BSC will over collect costs from some customers and under collect them from others. Distribution plant costs are caused by

⁴³ FERC defines Services Account 369 as "the cost installed of overhead and underground conductors leading from a point where wires leave the last pole of the overhead system or the distribution box or manhole, or the top of the pole of the distribution line, to the point of connection with the customer's outlet or wiring" and Meters Account 370 as "the cost installed of meters or devices and appurtenances thereto, for use in measuring the electricity delivered to its users, whether actually in service or held in reserve."

⁴⁴ See Docket Nos. E-04204A-15-0142 (UNS Electric) and E-01933A-19-0028 (Tucson Electric Power).

⁴⁵ Snook Direct at page 12, lines 6-8.


numerous customers with diverse characteristics. To recover these costs evenly among all residential customers is not cost based and should be rejected.

3 Q. Are there other negative effects of collecting a large amount of fixed costs in a fixed customer charge?

- Yes, there are several negative effects of high BSCs. High BSCs reduce customer control of bills, reduce the incentive to engage in energy efficiency behaviors and programs, have a disproportionate effect on low-income customers, and will lead to higher consumption because APS is suppressing the volumetric price due to higher revenue collection in BSC. I expand on each of these points below.
- 10 Q. Please describe how higher BSCs reduce customer control of bills.
- 11 A. In setting electric rates, APS must collect a necessary level of revenue per customer to 12 recover its cost of service. Revenue may be collected in volumetric rates or a fixed charge 13 (the BSC). The fixed charge is unavoidable and must be paid, regardless of the level of 14 electric consumption. The volumetric rate revenue is collected based on consumption. Rate 15 design that emphasizes lower (cost based) BSCs allow customers greater control of bills 16 because more revenue must be collected in the volumetric (controllable) part of the 17 customer bill. As the rise in customer defaults and late payments increase, customers will 18 need greater control of bills to maintain service.
- Q. Please describe how higher BSCs discourage investment in energy efficiency
 technologies and behavior.
- A. The APS proposal to collect more costs in BSCs than is justified by cost causation results in lower volumetric rates. Lower volumetric rates increase payback periods for energy efficiency and distributed generation technologies, discouraging investment in these beneficial technologies. Lower volumetric electricity prices also send a price signal to customers to increase consumption, which drives higher system costs and peak demand.
- Q. How significant are the rate design changes to payback periods for energy efficiency investments?
- A. Rate design can have a significant effect on payback periods for energy efficiency. The primary reason customers engage in energy efficiency programs is to save money on electric bills. Bill savings occur when customers make investments in energy efficient technologies or change behaviors to reduce consumption. Rate design significantly alters the payback periods for these investments. A 2017 study by the American Council for an

Energy Efficient Economy included an analysis on various rate designs and the payback period of attic insulation. ⁴⁶ This analysis was based on data from the APS Technical Resource Manual ("TRM") and showed differences in payback periods for 20 different rate design scenarios based on changes in BSCs, TOU rates, tiered rates, and demand charges. Figure 5 shows the results of this analysis.

Figure 5. Payback periods in years under 20 rate design scenarios. ⁴⁷ CC = Customer charge. TOU = Time-of-use rate. The ratios shown are the on- to off-peak ratios for time-of-use volumetric energy rates.



Rate design scenarios

As Figure 5 shows, the scenarios with the longest payback periods are those with the highest BSCs (referred to as customer charges or CC). The graphic shows the results for one measure, attic insulation, but the study shows the results for over twenty measures. All showed similar results: higher BSCs result in longer payback periods and higher payback periods discourage customers from investing in energy efficiency.

⁴⁶ Baatz, B. 2017. Rate Design Matters: The Intersection of Residential Rate Design and Energy Efficiency. American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy. aceee.org/sites/default/files/publications/researchreports/u1703.pdf

⁴⁷ Ibid.

1 Q. Please describe the impact of higher BSCs on low-income customers.

A. As discussed above, higher BSCs reduce customer control of bills because they increase the portion of the bill that is fixed. This is especially true for low-income customers who already face difficulties paying electric bills and need greater control of bills to avoid defaults and late payments. Increasing the BSC also diminishes rewards for low-income customers investing in energy efficiency. It is already difficult enough to deliver meaningful, cost-effective efficiency to low-income customers; this increase makes it even harder.

9 Q. Please explain how the APS BSC proposal will lead to higher consumption.

10 A. In short, customers respond to price signals, including electric rates. Higher rates lead to reduced consumption while lower rates lead to increased consumption. By shifting revenue recovery to fixed charges (the BSC), volumetric rates are reduced. Below, I will explain further with empirical research.

14 Q. What is price elasticity?

15 A. Price elasticity is an economic measure of how a consumer responds to changes in prices. 16 For most goods and services, customers consume less when prices are higher and more 17 when prices are lower. The changes in behavior and consumption pattern vary in the short and long term as well. For example, when gasoline prices are low, consumers tend to travel 18 19 more in the short term and buy less fuel-efficient cars in the long term. In the short term, 20 consumers have fewer options to respond to higher prices, but in the long term, consumers 21 have more options because they can alter larger purchase behavior and even alter where 22 they live to reduce commuting costs.

23 Q. How does price elasticity relate to electricity consumption?

A. Electricity is no different than many other commodities. Customers change behaviors and purchasing habits based on changes in prices. Price elasticity for electricity has been studied for over 50 years in the United States. These studies consistently show that customers reduce electric consumption when prices are high and increase consumption when prices are low.

One commonly cited study was conducted by the Electric Power Research Institute ("EPRI") in 2008. 48 This study analyzed the price responsiveness of residential electricity consumers to changes in volumetric electricity prices. EPRI has low, high, and mean estimates of the price responsiveness of residential consumers to changes in retail electricity prices both in the near term and in the long-run.

EPRI's price response estimates come from a review of several studies examining how electricity customers change their consumption in reaction to changes in prices. These studies used actual data on electricity prices and usage by residential customers. The EPRI paper reports a range of estimates of how sensitive consumers are to changes in prices from these studies. The short-run mean estimate of this sensitivity, known in economic terms as elasticity, was found to be -0.3, indicating that a 1% increase in volumetric electricity rates would result in a 0.3% decrease in consumption. In this context, the "short-run" is not precisely defined but can be taken to cover a range of up to 5 years. In the long-run, consumers have more opportunities to change their habits and behavior as well as to respond to higher prices by investing in more energy-efficient appliances as the appliances age and need to be replaced. Reflecting this fact, long-run elasticities are typically higher than their short-run counterparts. In this case, EPRI found a mean long-term elasticity of -0.9, indicating that a 1% increase in volumetric electricity rates would reduce consumption by 0.9%.

Q. Are there other studies that show customers respond to changes in electricity prices?

A. Yes, there are many studies that show people respond to changes in electric rates. Most recently, the Department of Energy sponsored a series of studies on consumer behavior, rate design, and smart technologies. The studies showed consumers responded to higher prices by shifting demand to lower price periods or reducing overall consumption when placed on TOU rates. The peak period demand reductions were far less on average for the lowest peak to off-peak price ratios (6% for treatments with a peak to off-peak price ratio less than 2:1) than for the highest price ratios (18% for treatments with a peak to off-peak

⁴⁸ Electric Power Research Institute. 2008. *Price Elasticity of Demand for Electricity: A Primer and Synthesis*. epri.com/abstracts/Pages/ProductAbstract.aspx?ProductId=00000000001016264

price ratio greater than 4:1).⁴⁹ The peak to off-peak ratio is the ratio of the energy price for the two periods. Thus, the research shows the higher peak demand reductions occurred when the difference between the on and off-peak price was higher.

Q. Please describe the relevance of price elasticity of demand to the current APS rate case proposals.

A.

A. APS is proposing several rate designs that will increase overall consumption. APS is proposing higher BSCs, which will reduce the volumetric electric prices. As many previous price elasticity studies show, the lower prices will lead to increased consumption. The APS subscription pricing pilot removes the price signal to customers entirely, which will also increase overall consumption. The increases in overall consumption driven by these proposals will lead to higher system costs because increased overall consumption will require additional investments by APS over time to meet growing load. The higher overall consumption will also lead to higher air emissions from increased output on the APS system.

Q. How will the SWEEP/WRA proposals decrease overall consumption?

The decades of price elasticity research have demonstrated decreases in consumption when electricity prices are higher. To illustrate this effect based on empirical research, I examined how the lower BSC would decrease consumption for customers on the R-Basic rate. I redesigned the R-Basic rate using the BSC based on the basic customer method. My calculated BSC of \$8.03 is nearly half of the proposed APS BSC of \$15.15 per month for the R-Basic rate. When the revenue previously collected in the higher BSC is moved to the energy charge, the price per kWh increases from \$0.127 to \$0.137 per kWh, an increase of 8.5%.

To estimate the change in consumption in the short-run, I used the EPRI price elasticity result of -0.3. This elasticity implies that for every 1% increase in price, customer demand will decrease by 0.3%. For an 8.5% increase in the energy price, we would expect a decrease in consumption of 2.56%. For the customers on R-Basic moving from APS's proposed rate to the SWEEP/WRA proposed rate, this would mean a decrease of 26,732 MWh of energy sales. The decrease in sales not only decreases costs related to serving the

⁴⁹ See United States Department of Energy. 2016. Customer Acceptance, Retention, and Response to Time-Based Rates from the Consumer Behavior Studies. Smart Grid Investment Grant Program. energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/06/f24/ARRA-CBS_interim_program_impact_report_June2015.pdf

- additional load, but also decreases harmful emissions because of decreased generation.
- 2 Conversely, for customers moving from the SWEEP/WRA proposed rate to APS's
- proposed rate, this would mean an additional 26,732 MWh of energy sales.

Q. Can you estimate the potential increase in emissions from the estimated change in consumption from a higher BSC and lower volumetric rates?

- 6 A. Yes. All generators in Arizona report air emissions for several pollutants to the
- 7 Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). The EPA publishes emissions rates (rate of air
- 8 emissions per unit of energy produced) for all fifty states in the Emissions & Generation
- 9 Resource Integrated Database ("eGRID").

10 Q. What is eGRID and how does its source air emissions data?

11 According the EPA, eGRID is a comprehensive inventory of environmental attributes of A. 12 electric power systems. The preeminent source of air emission data for the electric power 13 sector, eGRID is based on available plant-specific data for all U.S. electricity generating 14 plants that provide power to the electric grid and report data to the U.S. government, eGRID uses data from the Energy Information Administration (EIA) Forms EIA-860 and EIA-923 15 16 and EPA's Clean Air Markets Program Data. Emission data from EPA are carefully 17 integrated with generation data from EIA to produce useful values like pounds of emissions 18 per megawatt-hour of electricity generation (lb/MWh), which allows direct comparison of 19 the environmental attributes of electricity generation, eGRID also provides aggregated data by state, U.S. total, and by three different sets of electric grid boundaries (i.e., balancing 20 authority area, NERC region, and eGRID subregion). 50 eGRID publishes state level 21 22 emissions rates for criteria air pollutants. I used the emissions rates (lbs/MWh) and the increased generation to estimate the increased emissions. 23

Q. What are the results of this analysis?

24

A. The results show significant increases in air emissions from small increases in consumption. Table 4 shows the increase in air pollution for the increase in sales driven by higher BSCs for the R-Basic rate for carbon dioxide ("CO₂"), nitrogen oxide ("NO₂"), and sulfur dioxide ("SO₂"). This change in emissions is based on the increase of 26,732 MWh calculated above.

⁵⁰ United States Environmental Protection Agency. "Emissions and Generation Resource Integrated Database (eGRID) Questions and Answers. Accessed on July 19, 2020. epa.gov/energy/emissions-generation-resource-integrated-database-egrid-questions-and-answers

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

18

19

20

21

22

23

Pollutant	Emissions rate (lbs/MWh)	Increase in Pollution (tons)
CO ₂	1211.3	16,190
NO _X	0.6	8.0
SO ₂	0.3	4.0

Q. WHAT ARE THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE INCREASE IN AIR POLLUTION?

A. As the analysis shows, even a small increase in consumption produces large increases in power plant emissions. Power plant emissions, including CO₂, NO_X, and SO₂ impose harmful effects on the natural environment and human health. All three of these emissions impose societal costs because of these harmful effects. Harmful effects of these air pollutants include, but are not limited to, irritation of human respiratory systems, ⁵¹ fine particles that reduce visibility, ⁵² and higher temperatures which increase prevalence of heat waves.

11 Q. Would the results be similar for the other residential rate schedules?

- 12 A. Yes. Customers on R-Basic only represent 8% of the test year MWh sales for APS. The
 13 BSC is incorrectly calculated for all rate schedules, which artificially suppresses the
 14 volumetric energy prices, leading to higher consumption.
- Q. Please summarize your conclusions and recommendations regarding the APS BSC proposal.
- 17 A. The APS residential BSC proposal should be rejected by the Commission because it:
 - is not cost based;
 - reduces customer control of bills;
 - reduces customer incentives to invest in energy efficiency and distributed generation;
 - harms low-income customers who need greater control of bills to avoid defaults and late payments; and

⁵¹ United States Environmental Protection Agency. "Nitrogen Dioxide (NO2) Pollution," epa.gov/no2-pollution

⁵² United States Environmental Protection Agency. "Sulfur Dioxide (SO2) Pollution," Accessed on October 4, 2020. epa.gov/so2-pollution/sulfur-dioxide-basics#effects

 leads to higher consumption because APS is suppressing the volumetric price due to higher revenue collection in BSC.

The Commission should adopt a BSC developed using the basic customer method. My calculation of the BSC using this method results in a monthly BSC of \$8.03. The Commission should adopt \$8.03 for all residential rate options and require APS to refile residential rates with the additional revenue reflected in volumetric rates.

IV. THE APS SUBSCRIPTION RATE PILOT PROPOSAL IS NOT IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND SHOULD BE REJECTED

Q. Please describe the APS subscription rate pilot proposal.

APS is proposing to conduct a pilot in which a randomly selected group of 5,000 customers will be placed on a subscription rate option. Under this option, APS will bill these customers a fixed monthly amount, no matter how much electricity the customers use in the month. The monthly bill for the two-year pilot period would be based on the previous 12 months of usage, calculated based on proposed rates (not historic bills). 2,500 of the 5,000 customers will be the "control" group of the experiment, meaning these customers will not receive any "treatments," which is a utility-controlled demand response device, as part of the experiment. The remaining 2,500 customers will need to have a WIFI thermostat installed, which will be controllable by APS. The Company is also proposing to bill customers without WIFI thermostats an additional fee of 5% to cover the expected increases in consumption.⁵³

Q. Do you support the APS subscription rate pilot program?

A. No, I do not. I have significant concerns with the pilot program. Under this proposal, APS would bill customers using a flat bill approach, meaning customers would receive no price signals regarding how their consumption influences the APS costs to serve that customer. Because of the complete lack of a price signal, customers would essentially be on an "all you can eat" rate plan, meaning they could use as much electricity at any point in the day throughout the month with no financial repercussions. APS would have limited control of consumption because the Company is only proposing to control thermostats for half of the customers.

A.

⁵³ Hobbick Direct at page 6-8.

The proposed subscription rate pilot program also violates critical principles of rate design, specifically the fair-cost apportionment objective and optimum-use or consumer rationing objective. According to Professor James Bonbright, the author of Principles of Public Utility Rates, the fair-cost apportionment objective "invokes the principle that the burden of meeting the total revenue requirements must be distributed fairly among the beneficiaries of that service." The subscription rate pilot would charge customers a flat amount for consumption, regardless of usage, meaning these customers would likely be charged less than other customers for the same service, which is a violation of the fairness principle. The optimum-use or consumer rationing objective requires that "rates are designed to discourage wasteful use of public utility services while promoting all use that is economically justified in view of the relationships between costs incurred and benefits received." The subscription rate pilot program would encourage wasteful use of electricity because it does not send customers actionable price signals regarding when and how to consume electricity.

Q. Why do you believe customers would consume more electricity under the subscription rate pilot program?

A. There are two primary reasons of why I think overall consumption would increase for customers on the subscription rate pilot program. First, evidence from other utilities indicates a significant increase in consumption under similar rate designs. Second, APS is expecting large increases in consumption that will not be offset by utility controlled smart thermostats. I will expand on both of these points.

Q. Please describe the evidence from other utilities on this approach to billing customers.

A. There are other utilities offering flat bill options elsewhere in the United States. Georgia Power is the most cited example. Georgia Power has offered a flat bill option to residential customers for decades.⁵⁶ The customer's monthly bill is based on the average of the previous 12 months, but also includes an additional 10% fee to cover increased consumption. The 10% is not included in the Georgia Power's revenue requirement and

⁵⁴ Bonbright, J. 1961. Principles of Public Utility Rates. Columbia University Press: New York and London. Page 292.

⁵⁵ Ibid

⁵⁶ Georgia Power FLATBILL SCHEDULE, "FLAT-5." <u>georgiapower.com/content/dam/georgia-power/pdfs/residential-pdfs/residential-rate-plans/FLAT-5.pdf</u>

any financial losses or gains are absorbed by the utility. According to the Georgia Power 2018 FERC Form 1, over 12% of residential customers were on a flat bill. A review of the past four years of data shows these customers consistently use approximately 20% more electricity than customers on the standard residential rate. Table 5 shows the annual usage for the two customer groups over the four-year period.

Table 5. Georgia Power annual usage for residential standard and flat bill customers 2015 through 2018. Source; Georgia Power FERC Form 1 2015-2018.

	Annual		
Year	Residential	Flat Bill Residential	Difference
2015	12,403	14,800	19.3%
2016	12,418	15,016	20.9%
2017	11,542	14,065	21.9%
2018	12,466	15,126	21.3%

8 Q. Are you aware of other utilities offering flat bill?

A. Yes. Oklahoma Gas and Electric also offers a flat bill option. ⁵⁷ A review of the past four years shows a similar result. Customers on flat bill use substantially more electricity than customers who are not. In 2015 the difference was 10% but increased to nearly 15% by 2017. The difference is less substantial than for Georgia Power, but still significant. Table 6 shows the results of that review.

Table 6. Oklahoma Gas and Electric annual usage for residential standard and flat bill customers 2015 through 2018. Source; Oklahoma Gas and Electric FERC Form 1 2015-2018.

	Annual usage (kWh)			
Year	Residential	Guaranteed Flat Bill	Difference	
2015	12,607	13,868	10.0%	
2016	12,457	14,063	12.9%	
2017	11,849	13,607	14.8%	
2018	12,930	14,742	14.0%	

Q. APS is planning to require that customers have a smart thermostat as a condition of participating in the pilot, which will supposedly offset the increases in consumption. Will this alleviate your concerns about increased consumption?

⁵⁷ Oklahoma Gas and Electric. Rate Options. oge.com/wps/portal/oge/my-account/billing-payments/rate-options/

No, definitely not. APS currently includes smart thermostats in its demand side A. management ("DSM") program. For residential customers, the Company assumes annual savings of 83 kWh, which is less than one percent (0.68%) of average annual consumption.⁵⁸ The addition of utility control during specific events will increase the energy savings, but it is highly unlikely the utility control will offset the increased consumption. Furthermore, APS stated that customers will be able to override utility control of the thermostat with no penalty, reducing the likelihood of higher energy savings.59

9 Q. In your opinion, why would APS offer a rate option in which it would under collect revenue relative to usage?

A. APS, like other investor owned utilities, increases revenue through customer growth. The growth can occur in the number of customers, but also in total usage and peak demand for existing customers. Growth in peak demand allows APS to increase investments in distribution and generation capacity to meet the new demand. These new investments allow APS to continue to grow its rate base over time, ensuring returns to shareholders. The substantial growth in customer usage shown in other utilities with flat bill options would allow APS these opportunities.

Q. Are there other implications to the subscription rate pilot program beyond the increases in overall consumption?

A. The increases in overall consumption would drive larger investments in new capacity to meet demand growth but would also require APS to generate additional electricity to meet the demand. The additional electricity would increase costs for all customers but would also increase harmful emissions from increased power plant output. The APS generation fleet still relies on coal and natural gas, which produce CO₂, NO_X, SO₂, and particulate matter. All of these pollutants harm the natural environment and human health. I elaborated on how increased consumption drives increased air pollution in an earlier discussion on increased BSCs.

Q. But APS is proposing the subscription rates as a pilot. Why would you object to a limited pilot to gather information and better understand customer response to subscription rate options?

⁵⁸ See Exhibit BJB-8 APS Response to SWEEP DR 2.2.

⁵⁹ See Exhibit BJB-9 APS Response to SWEEP DR 1.23.

A. It would be a wasteful use of ratepayer dollars to undertake a pilot program that would unnecessarily increase consumption, driving higher system costs and air pollution in APS's service territory. APS residential customers have already been subjected to enough experimentation over the last three years under the rollout of its last rate design.

5 Q. Do you have additional recommendations regarding the subscription pricing pilot program?

A. Yes. Instead of implementing the Subscription Rate Pilot Program, APS should expand energy efficiency and demand response opportunities for all customers and couple these opportunities with rate design options that send customers actionable price signals, like APS's existing TOU rates. Coupling energy efficiency and demand response with time varying rates will allow APS to maximize customers' responses to rates, which will lower system costs and harmful emissions.

V. THE COMMISSION SHOULD AUTHORIZE APS TO COLLECT \$65 MILLION ANNUALLY IN BASE RATES FOR DSM PROGRAMS

16 Q. Why is it in the public interest to increase electric energy efficiency investment?

A.

Increased electric energy efficiency investment is in the public interest for several reasons. Increasing energy efficiency provides substantial cost-effective benefits for all APS customers, the electric system, the economy, and the environment. Electric energy efficiency is a reliable energy resource that is less expensive than other available energy resources. Consequently, increasing energy efficiency saves consumers and businesses money through lower electric bills and the deferral of unnecessary infrastructure, resulting in lower total costs for customers. Increasing energy efficiency also reduces load growth and peak demand, diversifies energy resources, enhances the reliability of the electricity grid, reduces the amount of water used for power generation, reduces air pollution, creates jobs that cannot be outsourced, and drives local economic growth. In addition, meeting a portion of load growth through increased energy efficiency can help to relieve system constraints in load pockets. By reducing electricity demand, energy efficiency mitigates electricity and fuel price increases and reduces customer vulnerability and exposure to price volatility. Energy efficiency does not rely on any fuel and is not subject to shortages of supply or increased prices for natural gas or other fuels.

1 Q. What have APS' recent efficiency investments accomplished?

- 2 A. From 2011-2019⁶⁰, APS reports that its efficiency programs:
- Provided over 43.7 million MWh of lifetime electric savings;
- Produced over 1,000 MW of peak demand savings;
- Saved over 13.6 billion gallons of water;

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

- Reduced harmful emissions significantly, including 19.3 million tons of CO₂, 96 tons of SO₂, and 1,800 tons of NO_X; and
 - Generated over \$1.9 billion in benefits to Arizona residents and businesses.

Additionally, energy efficiency has created more than 40,000 jobs across our state, including more than 28,000 in Phoenix.⁶¹ These jobs pay well, are local, and are in handson fields like installation so they cannot be easily outsourced.

Q. What kinds of efficiency programs does APS offer?

APS offers a "portfolio" of efficiency programs for both residential and commercial 13 A. 14 customers. Specialized programs and offerings are available for all customer types 15 including homeowners, renters, limited income customers, small businesses, schools, and 16 large commercial and industrial customers. Programs help low-income customers with a 17 series of home improvements, from insulation to appliance repair and replacement; help homeowners to seal leaky ductwork and fix malfunctioning HVAC units; and offer rebates 18 to help residents buy smart thermostats and more efficient pool pumps — to name a few 19 20 examples. APS was recently highlighted as one of fourteen leading utilities in a 2016 national report by ACEEE entitled, "Big Savers: Experiences and Recent History of 21 Program Administrators Achieving High Levels of Energy Savings."62 22

Q. Why should energy efficiency cost recovery be considered in the context of the APS rate case proceeding?

⁶⁰ APS Annual Demand Side Management reports filed with the Arizona Corporation Commission.

⁶¹ Environmental Entrepreneurs, Energy Efficiency Jobs in America: Arizona. https://www.e2.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/ARIZONA-Dist.pdf

⁶² Baatz, B. 2016. Big Savers: Experiences and Recent History of Program Administrators Achieving High Levels of Energy Savings. American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy. aceee.org/sites/default/files/publications/researchreports/u1601.pdf

1 A. The Commission, in approving any order that changes or increases rates for customers, 2 should ensure that the least expensive resource – energy efficiency – is fully pursued 3 beforehand. Consequently, in its order on the APS rate case, the Commission should ensure 4 that APS is on a path to continue delivering all cost-effective energy efficiency; ensure that 5 there is adequate funding to achieve all cost-effective energy savings levels and attain the 6 associated customer and public benefits; and treat energy efficiency as the core energy 7 resource that it is by providing a stable, long-term cost recovery mechanism and adequate 8 funding in base rates.

9 Q. What should the Commission do to ensure adequate efficiency investment and funding?

11 As a core resource meeting the real energy needs of customers at lowest cost, efficiency A. 12 should be adequately funded through a stable, fully embedded funding and cost recovery 13 mechanism as part of this case. In order to provide adequate and appropriate treatment for 14 this core, fundamental energy and capacity resource, a total of at least \$65 million of energy 15 efficiency program funding should be recovered in base rates. As a core resource, it is 16 appropriate for energy efficiency cost recovery to be mostly recovered in base rates rather 17 than in a separate adjustor mechanism. An adjustor mechanism should be used solely to true up actual expenditures versus authorized amounts collected in base rates. 18

19 Q. What is the basis for the \$65 million annual recommendation?

A. This amount is slightly more than the \$51.9 million budget that the Commission recently approved for APS to invest in cost effective energy efficiency programs in approving the 2020 DSM Plan.⁶³ APS has collected \$66.6 million in previous years.

Q. Do you recommend continuation of the demand side management adjustment charge?

25 A. Yes. The demand side management adjustment charge ("DSMAC") should continue to provide a mechanism to reconcile actual and planned spending. If APS does not spend the entire \$65 million, all unspent funds should be returned to customers on a current basis.

Likewise, if the Commission authorizes APS to recover additional dollars because of increased need, APS will be able to recover additional dollars through the DSMAC until its next rate case.

⁶³ Decision No. 77763, Docket No. E-01345A-19-0088. docket.images.azcc.gov/0000202208.pdf

1	\mathbf{O}	Do von	hove ony	othor	recommend	atione?
-	Q.	Do you	nave any	other	recommend	iativiis.

- Yes. In its order in the APS rate case, the Commission should also ensure that APS is on a
 path to meet minimum energy savings levels for the next decade.
- 4 Q. What energy savings levels should APS meet, by when?
- 5 A. Consistent with a proposal recently filed with the Commission that is supported by 32 different consumer, faith, environmental, and business entities, 64 APS should commit to deliver at least 1.3% net annual savings each year from 2020-2030.

8 VI. APS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO EARN A RETURN ON ENERGY EFFICIENCY INVESTMENTS

- 10 Q. Please summarize your recommendation on how APS should recover energy efficiency costs in base rates.
- 12 A. I recommend the Commission allow APS to rate base energy efficiency program costs and
- earn a return on these investments at the Commission approved rate of return. To do so,
- 14 the Commission should authorize APS to book energy efficiency program costs as a
- regulatory asset and amortize these costs over a seven-year period.
- 16 Q. Does APS currently earn a return on energy efficiency investments?
- 17 A. No. APS is currently expensing most energy efficiency costs over a one-year period through the DSM surcharge and \$20 million collected through base rates. 65
- Q. APS currently earns a performance incentive for energy efficiency. How is the performance incentive different than allowing APS to earn a return on energy efficiency investment costs?

⁶⁴ Joint Stakeholder Proposal for New Energy Rules, July 30th, 2019, Docket No. RU-00000A-18-0284. docket.images.azcc.gov/E000002141.pdf

The proposal is supported by: American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, Arizona Faith Network, Arizona Interfaith Power and Light, Arizona Solar Energy Industries Association (AriSEIA), AZ Public Health Association, Black Mesa Water Coalition, CHISPA Arizona, Citizen's Climate Lobby, Conservative Alliance for Solar Energy (CASE), Diné C.A.R.E., E4TheFuture, Earth Justice Ministry of Unitarian Universalist Congregation of Phoenix, Elders Climate Action, Environment Arizona Research & Policy Center, Grand Canyon Trust, League of Women Voters Arizona, Natural Resources Defense Council, Oculus-Studio, Our Mother of Sorrows Catholic Church, Physicians for Social Responsibility, Sierra Club, Solar Energy Industries Association (SEIA), Solar United Neighbors, SWEEP), Sunrun, Tó Nizhóní Ání, Tucson 2030 District, Vote Solar, Western Grid Group, WRA, Yavapai Climate Change Coalition, and Solar Gain.

⁶⁵ In matter of the application of Arizona Public Service Company for a Ruling Relating to its 2020 Demand Side Management Implementation Plan. Decision No. 76313, Docket No. E-01345A-16-0176.

A. A performance incentive is a different policy than allowing a utility to earn a return on energy efficiency investments. A performance incentive is a one-time payment to a utility for achieving specific goals or requirements. This payment is generally made after the implementation of the energy efficiency programs. For APS, the performance incentive payment is calculated based on net benefits of programs, driving APS to deliver programs that produce higher net benefits. A performance incentive is not guaranteed and only awarded after a utility has invested dollars in energy efficiency programs. In contrast, allowing APS to amortize expenses over multiple years and earn a return on the unamortized balance provides APS with greater certainty that budgets are stable, puts energy efficiency investments on equal footing with other capital investments in terms of attractiveness, and reduces rate impacts.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

Q. Should APS maintain its performance incentive if it is allowed to earn a return on its investment?

14 A. Yes. A performance incentive can still be a useful policy to motivate APS to meet specific
 policy goals.

16 Q. Why should APS be allowed to earn a return on energy efficiency investments?

17 A. APS has limited capital to invest in distribution infrastructure, customer information 18 technology and billing systems, generation assets, and other necessary projects to provide 19 service. The Company will logically invest in opportunities that provide the greatest return, 20 assuming regulatory approval. Energy efficiency has been the least cost resource available 21 to APS in recent years, but the Company has not fully invested in all cost-effective energy 22 efficiency resources because of limited earnings opportunities and potential revenue losses from reduced sales. Allowing APS to earn a return on energy efficiency investments will 23 24 increase the likelihood that the Company will invest in more cost-effective energy 25 efficiency because it makes the earnings opportunities comparable with other system 26 investments. Increasing investment in cost effective energy efficiency will lower costs in 27 the short and long term.

Q. Does your proposal increase the likelihood of APS inflating energy efficiency budgets simply to increase spending?

A. Potentially. It will be important for the ACC to carefully review energy efficiency filings in a timely fashion in order to avoid wasteful spending and continue to balance the interests of APS and its customers. There is also substantial national evidence and data to draw on

related to specific energy efficiency program cost metrics to consider while benchmarking

APS's proposals. 66

3 Q. Are there other states that allow utilities to earn a return on energy efficiency investments?

Yes, there are several other states that allow utilities to earn a return on energy efficiency program investments. I am aware that New Jersey, Maryland, Illinois, Utah, and Colorado do so. Each state allows utilities to earn a return on energy efficiency investments amortized over several years. The amortization periods vary but are not significantly different. The periods include New Jersey (seven years), Maryland (five years), Utah (ten years), Colorado (eight years), and Illinois (weighted average measure life).

11 Q. Should APS amortize the costs of efficiency over a multiple year period, like the other states just listed?

Yes. There are several reasons to amortize costs over multiple years. First, this approach reduces rate impacts of energy efficiency programs because costs are collected over several years instead of one. Second, amortizing cost recovery over multiple years aligns the timing of realized benefits with costs incurred by customers. Energy efficiency investments provide energy savings for multiple years and cost recovery should be aligned with the timing of benefits provided by these programs. Finally, allowing utilities to amortize costs of energy efficiency programs provides equal and comparable cost recovery treatment to other investments.

Q. Are you proposing a specific amortization period for this filing?

A.

A. Ideally, energy efficiency program costs would be amortized over a period equal to the weighted average measure life of the total portfolio, aligning the amortization period with the energy savings lifetime. This is the approach used in Illinois. However, this approach creates a different amortization period every year and could be administratively burdensome, creating disagreements on how to calculate the weighted average lifetime. For simplicity, I recommend the ACC adopt a seven-year amortization period. Seven years better aligns costs and benefits, reduces rate impacts, and moves cost recovery of energy efficiency investments comparable to supply side investments.

⁶⁶ Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. "What It Costs to Save Energy." emp.lbl.gov/projects/what-it-costs-save-energy/

Q. Would recovery of energy efficiency program costs in base rates decrease transparency for customers?

- 3 A. Absolutely not. All energy resources should be treated equally in terms of disclosure.
- 4 Recovering energy efficiency program costs through base rates would be consistent with
- 5 the treatment of other energy resources, whose costs are not expressly identified by the
- 6 current bill format.

7 Q. Has the Commission allowed efficiency program funding to be expensed in base rates previously?

- 9 A. Yes. In Commission Decision No. 67744, approving the settlement agreement to increase
- APS rates in 2005, an annual \$10 million allowance for DSM costs was approved for
- inclusion within base rates. In 2006, the year directly following that decision, the Company
- spent \$10.6 million on energy efficiency programs. Thus the \$10 million of funding in base
- rates equated to more than 90% of energy efficiency program expenditures in that year. In
- the last APS rate case, this amount was increased to \$20 million.

15 Q. Is there other recent precedent in Arizona supporting this approach?

- 16 A. Yes. As part of the 2019 Salt River Project ("SRP") pricing proceeding, SRP decided to
- treat energy efficiency like other capacity resources by funding and recovering efficiency
- program expenses in base rates instead of through a separate adjustment rider. 67 For
- example, over the next five years, SRP will expense between \$50-\$55 million per year in
- base rates for its efficiency programs.

Q. Would you also recommend the return on investment be adjusted based on APS performance in delivering energy efficiency savings?

- 23 A. Yes. However, this change would need to be considered as a potential replacement for the
- 24 current APS energy efficiency performance incentive. Energy efficiency performance
- should also be considered a key policy goal in the larger discussion of implementing a PBR
- 26 mechanism for APS, which I discuss in greater detail in Section VIII of this testimony.

⁶⁷ Salt River Project. Public Pricing Process. srpnet.com/prices/priceprocess/2019/default.aspx

VII. THE COMMISSION SHOULD REQUIRE APS TO RESET THE LFCR AND ESTABLISH AN EARNINGS TEST FOR RECOVERY.

- 4 Q. Please summarize the APS LFCR proposal in this case.
- A. APS is proposing to continue utilizing the LFCR in this case. However, according to Company witness Snook, APS is proposing to leave the lost fixed costs currently collected in the LFCR instead of resetting the mechanism to zero. Lost fixed cost recovery mechanisms are common across the United States, but it is highly unusual to not reset the mechanism during a general rate case.
- 10 Q. Please describe the LFCR.
- 11 A. The LFCR was first approved by the ACC in Decision No. 73183. The mechanism was developed to address APS's lost revenues from energy efficiency and distributed generation. The mechanism was modified in Decision 74202 to expand the costs included in the LFCR.
- 15 Q. Was the LFCR reset to zero following the last rate case?
- A. Yes. According to the Settlement Agreement, APS transferred the LFCR balance to base
 rates.⁶⁹
- 18 Q. Do you support continuation of the LFCR as proposed by APS?
- A. No, I do not. The LFCR is an inferior policy to full revenue decoupling. If the Commission decides to adopt a formula rate or full revenue decoupling (as SWEEP has proposed in the last several APS rate cases), the LFCR should be discontinued. However, if the ACC determines the LFCR should continue, it should be reset to zero. Resetting a lost revenue recovery rider to zero in the context of a rate case is standard practice and eliminates the potential for over recovery of authorized fixed costs because the bill determinants are also reset during a rate case.
- 26 Q. Please elaborate on what you mean by the billing determinants reset to zero.
- A. The LFCR is currently recovering a portion of lost revenues authorized during the last APS rate case. These revenues would have otherwise been collected in volumetric rates established based on revenue requirements and billing determinants for each customer

⁶⁸ Snook Direct at page 3, lines 1-5.

⁶⁹ Decision No. 76295. August 18, 2017. docket.images.azcc.gov/0000182160.pdf

class. In a rate case, the billing determinants are based on a test year, which includes the reduced sales from energy efficiency and distributed generation for that period. When rates are established using those billing determinants, the assumed "lost revenues" are included in new rates. This is why utilities who rely on lost revenue recovery mechanisms reset these riders to zero during a base rate case. I recommend APS also reset the LFCR to zero in this case.

7 Q. Did APS provide any justification for keeping costs in the LFCR?

A. APS stated that it is proposing to keep costs in the LFCR to "ensure the estimated net bill impacts put forth in this rate case are what consumers can expect on the rate effective date." It sounds like APS is concerned about a messaging issue to its customers rather than avoiding potential double recovery of costs.

12 Q. Do you have any other recommendations related to the LFCR?

A. Yes. I recommend the Commission require an earnings test as a condition of receiving LFCR revenue in the future. An earnings test would require APS to submit documentation of actual versus authorized revenues for the year in question. If APS earned its authorized revenues, the Company should not be allowed to recover any LFCR revenues until it makes a showing that revenues are deficient. An earnings test would protect APS ratepayers from over recovery of revenues, which has been an issue in recent years.

19 Q. Are you aware of examples of other utilities or commissions that use an earnings test?

A. Yes. New Jersey Natural Gas is subject to an earnings test on an annual basis to recover lost revenues through its Conservation Incentive Program filing. The Company must show that it did not earn more than its rate of return on common equity to recover lost revenues from its energy efficiency programs.⁷¹

⁷⁰ See Exhibit BJB-10 APS Response to SWEEP DR 1.19.

⁷¹ In The Matter Of The Petition Of New Jersey Natural Gas Company For The Annual Review And Revision Of Its Basic Gas Supply Service (BGSS) And Conservation Incentive Program (CIP) Rates For F/Y 2021. Docket No. GR20060378. May 29, 2020. ning.com/regulatory/pdf/NJNG-2021-Annual-BGSS-and-CIP-Filing-transmittal.pdf

VIII. THE COMMISSION SHOULD CONSIDER A PBR FRAMEWORK FOR APS.

Q. Please describe the recent trends driving the need for regulatory reform in Arizona.

There are several key trends that are driving the need for regulatory reform in Arizona. Recent growth in customer-sited rooftop solar coupled with declining volumetric sales driven by energy efficiency have presented revenue recovery issues for utilities. The revenue recovery concerns have led utilities to propose rate design focused more on revenue recovery than cost causation. These approaches have limited customer control of bills. Finally, APS has faced considerable customer service issues resulting from its failed rollout of new rate designs from its last rate case.

A recommendation to consider performance-based ratemaking is mainly driven by the need for regulatory reform in Arizona. Arizona currently relies on a utility business model approach that is outdated and in need of significant updating. The current model is based on utilities recovering cost of service with a fair return. It incentivizes utilities to promote sales growth and grow rate base through capital additions, while not focusing on the value of service to customers. The current business model is also heavily focused on revenue recovery, which has driven utilities to request rate design options that are not in the best interests of customers or based on cost causation.

Q. Why is PBR suitable for APS at this time?

A. In addition to the points made above related to the general need for regulatory reform in Arizona, APS customer satisfaction is very low.⁷² Customer complaints following the implementation of APS's new rate plans were significantly high, as were the number of defaults and late payments for residential customers. APS's earnings should be motivated by customer satisfaction, not revenue recovery.

Q. What is PBR?

A.

A. PBR is a regulatory approach that aligns revenues and utility earnings with performance goals and metrics. The general objective of this approach is to move away from simple cost of service ratemaking that drives electric utilities towards large capital investments and increasing volumetric sales to maximize revenue to revenue opportunities that maximize

⁷² J.D. Power. 2019. Electric Utility Residential Customer Satisfaction Study. <u>jdpower.com/business/press-releases/2019-electric-utility-residential-customer-satisfaction-study</u>

value for customers. Technology has changed significantly since the early days of utility regulation and approaches to revenue recovery should also change.

There are many ways to approach PBR, ranging from simple (performance incentives on energy efficiency) to complex (formula rate plans layered with numerous quantified performance metrics). The approach should focus on the jurisdictional regulatory goals and be reviewed and updated to refine the policy based on experience.

7 Q. Is APS already engaged in PBR?

1 2

3

4

5

6

15

24

25

A. Yes, somewhat. The ACC approved the current APS demand side management performance incentive under Decision No. 77763.⁷³ The current incentive structure allows APS to earn up to 8% of the total net benefits of the program but is capped at \$0.0125/kWh saved. The performance incentive does not require APS to meet any specific savings targets or other program related goals. While this incentive likely drives APS to deliver energy savings with higher net benefits, it could be much improved and provide additional financial incentives tied to APS meeting additional policy goals.

Q. Are other states engaged in PBR?

16 A. Yes. While not a new concept or idea, interest in PBR has grown in recent years. Several 17 key trends, including declining and flattening volumetric sales, growth of distributed 18 generation, and the proliferation of new energy technologies, continue to threaten the 19 traditional utility business model. While many states have implemented PBR-like 20 performance incentives for various aspects of utility business operations (including this 21 Commission), several states have explored implementing PBR. These states include 22 Illinois, Massachusetts, New York, Minnesota, and Hawaii. I will expand on Illinois, 23 Hawaii, Minnesota, and Massachusetts below.

d. Illinois

Q. Please provide detail on the Illinois PBR framework.

A. In October 2011, the Illinois General Assembly passed the Energy Infrastructure Modernization Act. The law addressed infrastructure modernization, but also focused on regulatory reform and the establishment of performance metrics. The bedrock of the regulatory reforms was the development of performance-based formula rates. Formula

⁷³ Arizona Corporate Commission. Decision No. 77763. October 2, 2020. Docket No. E-01345A-19-0088.

rates are not a new concept but have generally been used by FERC where financial returns have not been tied to performance.

The performance-based formula rate is optional for utilities in Illinois and only covers distribution related costs. The law required participating utilities to make investments in infrastructure and customer assistance designed to reduce costs for customers. ComEd and Ameren, the two largest utilities in the state, both elected to participate and have made substantial modernization investments since 2011.

The formula rate process relies on forecasted costs and billing determinants to set rates, but then reconciles rates based on actual costs and sales. The formula resets rates annually, with an annual reconciliation as well. Both parts of this process, the establishment of rates using forecasted data and reconciling rates based on actual costs and sales, undergo regulatory review in a docketed case process.

Q. Please describe the performance-based aspect of the formula rate in Illinois.

For ComEd, the performance-based aspect of this approach comes in the form of a return on equity ("ROE") penalty if ComEd does not meet specific performance metrics.⁷⁴ There are no ROE rewards or bonuses for meeting the performance metric goals below, only the potential penalties. The penalties cannot exceed a 50-basis point adjustment. The metrics fall under the following general categories:

1. Reliability

A.

- a. System Average Interruption Frequency Index ("SAIFI") and Consumer Average Interruption Duration Index ("CAIDI") targets based on reducing the frequency and duration of outages over a ten-year period with annual targets.
- b. Service reliability targets
 - i. Customers whose immediate primary source of service operates at 69,000 volts or above should not have experienced: i) More than three controllable interruptions in each of the last three consecutive years. ii) More than nine hours of total interruption

⁷⁴ For more information on the ComEd performance metrics, see *Commonwealth Edison Company's Multi-Year Performance Metrics Annual Report for the Year Ending December 31, 2018.* April 8, 2019. Filed in Docket No. 11-0772, Illinois Commerce Commission.

1	duration due to controllable interruptions in each of the last three
2	consecutive years.
3	ii. Customers whose immediate primary source of service operates
4	at more than 15,000 volts, but less than 69,000 volts, should not
5	have experienced: i) More than four controllable interruptions in
6	each of the last three consecutive years. ii) More than twelve
7	hours of total interruption duration due to controllable
8	interruptions in each of the last three consecutive years.
9	iii. Customers whose immediate primary source of service operates
10	at 15,000 volts or below should not have experienced: i) More
11	than six controllable interruptions in each of the last three
12	consecutive years. ii) More than eighteen hours of total
13	interruption duration due to controllable interruptions in each of
14	the last three consecutive years.
15	2. Minority-Owned and Women-Owned Business Enterprises ("MWBE")
16	a. Goal to increase its capital expenditures paid to MWBE by 15% over
17	the 10-year period.
18	3. Advanced Metering Infrastructure Related Metrics
19	a. Reducing the number of estimated electric bills by 90% over a ten-year
20	period.
21	b. Reduce consumption on inactive meters by 90% ratably over a ten-year
22	period.
23	c. Reduce unaccounted for energy by 50% ratably over a ten-year period.
24	d. Reduce uncollectible expense by \$30,000,000 ratably over a ten-year
25	period.
26	e. Aggregate average percent to goal on Consumption on Inactive Meters,
27	Unaccounted for Energy, and Uncollectible Expense.

Q. Does Illinois also have a performance incentive or penalty for energy efficiency performance?

A. Yes. Public Act 99-0906, also known as the Future Energy Jobs Act, was enacted in 2016.⁷⁵
This law created energy efficiency savings goals, outlined cost recovery methods, and provided a performance incentive/penalty structure for participating utilities. Utilities have an opportunity to earn a reward or face a penalty based on meeting energy efficiency savings targets. The penalties and awards vary based on the size of the utility and the year of performance.

Q. What have the results been in Illinois under PBR?

9

17

18

19

20

21

A. Ameren Illinois and ComEd both elected to participate in the formula rate structure allowed under the Energy Infrastructure Modernization Act. According to a recent report by the Illinois Commerce Commission ("ICC"), both utilities are on track to meet the investment requirements under the Act. In 2017, the ICC reported that ComEd's residential customers saw a decrease in rates between 2011 and 2017 (-0.0922% compounded annual growth rate) while Ameren residential customer saw a modest increase during this time period (1.68% annual compound growth rate).⁷⁶

In a 2017 annual report, ComEd boasted significant reliability benefits and customer savings created through the grid modernization efforts, claiming \$1.4 billion in societal savings produced through avoided outages.⁷⁷

e. Massachusetts

Q. Please provide background on the PBR efforts in Massachusetts.

A. In 2017 the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities ("DPU") approved PBR for Eversource through its rate case. Eversource already utilized a decoupling mechanism to ensure collection of DPU authorized revenues, but was experiencing a loss of sales growth

⁷⁵ For more on the details of the performance incentive/penalty structure, please see Illinois 220-ILCS 5/ Public Utilities Act.

ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/ilcs4.asp?ActID=1277&ChapterID=23&SeqStart=35100000&SeqEnd=39400000

⁷⁶ Report on the Energy Infrastructure Modernization Act's Infrastructure Program and Performance Based Formula Rate Plan. Illinois Commerce Commission. December 2017.

icc.illinois.gov/downloads/public/ga/Energy%20Infrastructure%20Modernization%20Act%20Report%20Dec%202017.pdf

⁷⁷ Five Year Capstone Report, Commonwealth Edison Company. 2017.
comed.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/AboutUs/ComEdProgressReport2017.pdf

⁷⁸ See Order Establishing Revenue Requirement for NSTAR Electric Company and Western Massachusetts Electric Company (each doing business as Eversource Energy). Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities. eversource.com/content/docs/default-source/investors/d-p-u-17-05-final-order-(revenue-requirement)-11-30-17.pdf

between rate cases that had previously allowed the Company to fund ongoing capital investments. Intervenors in the rate case argued that a capital cost recovery mechanism would be an appropriate substitute for PBR, but the DPU disagreed, citing the administrative burden of frequent rate cases and review of the capital recovery mechanism. DPU also stated that the PBR mechanism will allow greater incentives to meet various state policy goals.

The DPU approved the PBR formula rate plan for a five-year term and stay-out provision (Eversource will not file a rate case) unless its actual ROE falls more than 200 basis points below the approved ROE.

The DPU did not adopt new performance incentive metrics for the Eversource PBR plan. Instead, the existing service quality metrics would continue to be assessed, with penalties for inability to meet these metrics. However, the DPU did establish a process to adopt final metrics and benchmarks for additional performance metrics related to the PBR plan. As part of this process, DPU directed Eversource to develop metrics focused on:

- 1. Level of customer satisfaction and engagement;
- 2. Reductions in peak demand; and
- 3. Progress towards climate adaptation and greenhouse gas reductions.

f. Minnesota

A.

Q. Please provide background on the PBR efforts in Minnesota.

The Minnesota Public Utilities Commission ("MNPUC") is currently examining performance-based regulation for Xcel Energy, the state's largest electric utility.⁷⁹ The development of performance metrics was required after Xcel Energy proposed a multiyear rate plan in 2016.⁸⁰ The goal of this process is to establish performance metrics for Xcel Energy, which may ultimately lead to financial incentives. The process is still ongoing, and stakeholders are working together to answer many critical questions about the performance metrics. The process is divided into two distinct phases, the first to establish metrics and the second is to determine how they will be calculated. The development of metrics is focused on meeting five MNPUC defined outcomes of the process. These five outcomes include:

⁷⁹ See Docket No. E-002/CI-17-401.

⁸⁰ Minn. Stat. § 216B.16, subd. 19.

1	1. Affordability;
2	2. Reliability, including both customer and system-wide perspectives;
3	3. Customer service quality, including satisfaction, engagement and
4	empowerment;
5	4. Environmental performance, including carbon reductions and beneficial
6	electrification; and
7	5. Cost effective alignment of generation and load, including demand response.
8	In September 2019, the MNPUC adopted a series of performance metrics for Xcel
9	Energy. ⁸¹ These metrics include:
10	1. Affordability - average monthly bills, revenue per kWh, total arrearages, and
11	total disconnections for nonpayment;
12	2. Reliability - SAIDI, SAIFI, CAIDI, CELID, CEMI, and ASAI;
13	3. Customer Service Quality - JD Power customer satisfaction score, call-center
14	response time, billing invoice accuracy, and number of customer complaints;
15	4. Environmental Performance - total carbon emissions, carbon intensity, total
16	criteria pollutant emissions, total criteria pollutant intensity, additional metrics
17	measuring the impact of electrification in other sectors, including
18	transportation, agricultural, and buildings; and
19	5. Cost Effective Alignment of Generation and Load - demand response capacity
20	available and called, metrics measuring the amount of demand response that (i)
21	shapes customer load profiles through price response, time-varying rates, or
22	behavior campaigns, (ii) shifts energy consumption from times of high demand
23	to times when there is a surplus of renewable generation, and (iii) sheds loads
24	that can be curtailed to provide peak capacity and support the system in
25	contingency events.
26	This list is not exhaustive but is intended to present a summary of most of the metrics
27	adopted by the MNPUC. The Commission also directed stakeholders to develop several
28	"future" metrics focused in specific areas of interest. The second phase of the proceeding.

⁸¹ See Order Establishing Performance Metrics, In the Matter of a Commission Investigation to Identify Performance Metrics, and Potentially, Incentives for Xcel Energy's Electric Utility Operation. September 18, 2019. Docket No. E-002/CI-17-401. Minnesota Public Utilities Commission.

to determine how to measure and track the approved metrics, is currently underway and expected to be completed in 2020.

g. Hawaii

1

2

3 4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

A.

Q. Please provide background on the PBR efforts in Hawaii.

In 2018, the Hawaii Public Utilities Commission ("HIPUC") opened a proceeding into PBR. Hawaii had recently adopted a 100% renewable energy goal by 2045 and customer behavior and technology adoption have been rapidly changing there. The proceeding will occur over multiple phases. The first phase was intended to identify core elements of the PBR framework and direct the development of key details in the second phase. 82 The second phase will focus on the design and implementation of regulatory mechanisms to achieve the goals outlined in Phase 1. Hawaii's process is holistic, including a focus on revenue mechanisms and performance metrics.

The Phase 1 process produced a series of principles and goals for the Phase 2 process. The three guiding principles include:⁸³

- A customer-centric approach. A PBR framework should encourage the expanding opportunities for customer choice and participation in all appropriate aspects of utility system functions, including verifiable "day-one" savings for customers.
- 2. Administrative efficiency. PBR offers an opportunity to simplify the regulatory framework and enhance overall administrative efficiency.
- 3. Utility financial integrity. The financial integrity of the utility is essential to its basic obligation to provide safe and reliable electric service for its customers and a PBR framework is intended to preserve the utility's opportunity to earn a fair return on its business and investments, while maintaining attractive utility features, such as access to low-cost capital.

The regulatory goals are focused on enhancing customer experience, improving utility performance, and advancing social outcomes. Through the Phase 1 process, the HIPUC also directed the development of priority revenue adjustment mechanisms in Phase

⁸² See Decision and Order No. 36326. Public Utilities Commission of Hawaii. Instituting a Proceeding to Investigate Performance Based Regulation. Docket No. 2018-0088. May 23, 2019.

⁸³ Order at 6.

2, including multiyear formula rate plans and earnings sharing mechanisms, and priority performance mechanisms, including performance incentive mechanisms, shared savings mechanisms, and scorecards and reported metrics. Phase 2 is currently underway and expected to be completed in late 2020.

h. PBR Conclusions

A.

A.

Q. Please summarize your takeaways from these examples as they relate to APS's current rate case.

These examples provide background information and source documents on the approaches utilized in these states. PBR is generally made up of two parts, a formula rate or revenue recovery mechanism and a performance incentive mechanism. The formula rate allows a utility to recover prudently incurred costs in a timely manner. Customers are protected from overearning because revenues are reconciled with actual costs and sales, meaning customers are only charged for costs that are actually incurred. Formula rates, through well-defined protocols, also can reduce rate case expense and litigation that typically comes with traditional rate cases. APS has discussed a formula rate in this case but has not proposed a specific mechanism for consideration.

These examples illustrate several states that are currently grappling with the need for regulatory reform. These states face many of the same issues Arizona is facing today, especially the need to update the traditional utility business model that rewards capital expenditures and promotes sales growth.

Q. What are some performance metrics the ACC could consider in a PBR approach for APS?

- There are many metrics the ACC could consider when approaching PBR for APS. However, these metrics should be carefully considered. They should be quantifiable, within the utility's control, and easily understood by all stakeholders. The primary purpose of establishing financial incentives for meeting performance metrics is to motivate a utility to behavior that would not occur absent the incentives. A utility should not be given financial incentives for things it would have done in the absence of the incentives. Some metrics may include:
 - 1. Reliability reducing the frequency and duration of outages;
 - 2. Customer Service improving customer satisfaction during customer calls, reducing customer complaints, and improving billing accuracy;

3. Safety – reducing Company work related accidents;

- 4. Energy Efficiency exceeding energy savings goals and achieving other quantifiable performance metrics driven by state policy goals;
- 5. Renewable Energy increasing the renewable energy percentage of generation portfolio beyond statutorily required levels;
- Emissions reductions reducing CO₂ emissions, specifically those related to generation (including owned generation, purchase power agreements, and market purchases);
- 7. TOU Rates increasing the numbers of customers on time of use rates, which drive many benefits to customers;
- 8. Peak Demand Reduction reducing local and system peaks;
- Delinquent Accounts reducing the number of delinquent accounts and bad debt expense driven by nonpayment of bills. This can be done by giving customers tools to manage bills, like energy efficiency measures; and
- 10. EV Programs increasing the number of charging stations installed, number of customers subscribed to EV TOU rates, and performance of managed charging programs.

Q. How do you recommend the Commission proceed?

A. In February of this year, Commissioner Márquez Peterson opened a docket to investigate the role of performance incentive mechanisms in Arizona rate cases. I recommend the Commission initiate a workshop in that docket to begin a statewide discussion of PBR in Arizona. While not necessarily required, a multiyear formula rate plan should also be considered in combination with a series of performance metrics to align APS' financial interests with societal goals. The benefits of this approach are significant, but it will require substantial resources to develop an effective approach. Decoupling is discussed previously in my testimony as another approach to address APS's revenue recovery issues while aligning the Company's interests with its customers. A decoupling mechanism should be considered as a near term solution to the problems facing APS but is less desirable than a multiyear formula rate plan.

IX. <u>CONCLUSION</u>

1

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

- 2 Q. Please summarize your recommendations to the Commission in this case.
- 3 A. I recommend the following:
- 1. The Commission should freeze all residential three-part rates to new customer enrollment and discontinue these rates options.
- The Commission should deny APS' request to increase the BSC for residential and
 general service customers and set the BSC at \$8.03 for all residential rates.
 - 3. The Commission should require APS to shorten the TOU on-peak window to three hours from 4 p.m. to 7 to improve customer response and to better align with current APS customer consumption patterns and cost of service.
 - The Commission should require APS to default all new APS residential customers to TOU rates.
 - The Commission should order APS to restructure residential EV rates to provide price signals that encourage off-peak charging by providing a night super off-peak period to winter and summer months.
 - 6. The Commission should order APS to recover \$65 million of energy efficiency program costs in base rates.
 - 7. The Commission should allow APS to book energy efficiency program costs as a regulatory asset, amortize these costs over a seven-year period, and earn a return on these investments.
 - The Commission should reject the APS proposal to keep some costs in the LFCR and should reset the adjustor to zero.
 - The Commission should require APS to submit documentation of actual lost revenue through an earnings test in order to collect any revenue through the LFCR.
 - 10. The Commission should reject the APS proposal to conduct a subscription pricing pilot.
- 11. The Commission should initiate the already opened statewide generic investigation into
 PBR to improve utility business models in Arizona by allowing utilities revenue
 opportunities to meet specific performance metrics and goals.
- 29 Q. Does this complete your direct testimony?
- 30 A. Yes.

EXHIBIT BJB - 1

Professional Experience

Gabel Associates Inc. Vice President Highland Park, NJ 2018-Present

- Support and advise clients on a variety of energy and regulatory issues including retail
 and wholesale electric rate design, energy efficiency policy and program design, cost
 benefit analysis, resource planning, and renewable energy project development.
- Lead consultant to the solar industry in New York Reforming the Energy Vision (REV) regulatory process on rate design for mass market customers.
- Provide ongoing consulting services to multiple gas and electric utilities on energy efficiency program design, cost benefit analysis, avoided cost development, strategic guidance, and program delivery in New Jersey.
- Advise various wholesale energy market clients, including power plant project developers and operators on regulatory issues such as retail ratemaking, wholesale ratemaking, RTO governance, FERC rulemakings, and other relevant issues.
- Provide technical expert testimony for various clients in regulatory matters before state energy commissions. Have testified in Arizona, Colorado, Indiana, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Washington D.C

American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy Senior Manager, Utilities Program Washington, D.C. 2014-2018

- Oversaw and coordinated ACEEE's efforts related to utility sector energy efficiency programs. Served as project manager and lead author for research projects involving utility sector energy efficiency programs, business models, best practices, rate design, and other topics.
- Provided technical assistance for utilities and other energy efficiency implementation partners such as state government agencies on a variety of regulatory policy and best practice program topics.
- Filed testimony and formal comments before state regulatory commissions on issues related to energy efficiency programs, integrated resource planning, rate design, and other issues related to the best practices and policies for implementing energy efficiency.

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Energy Industry Analyst

Washington, D.C. 2013–2014

 Served as a technical expert in litigated cases before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission on behalf of the FERC trial staff. Issues examined included: wholesale energy rates, transmission rates, Open Access Transmission Tariff interpretation, transmission capacity rights, cost allocation for various customer classes, formula rate mechanics and protocols, electric cost of service, interruptible load, rate design, and regional transmission organization functionality and governance. Maryland Public Service Commission Energy Analyst Baltimore, MD 2012–2013

Reviewed and analyzed utility filings for EmPOWER Maryland statewide energy
efficiency, conservation, and demand response programs. Presented results of research
before the Commission. Worked closely with the Agency energy efficiency evaluation
contractor to develop evaluation policies that reduced costs for Maryland ratepayers
while ensuring integrity of the evaluation process.

Indiana Office of Utility Consumer Counselor Utility Analyst

Indianapolis, IN 2011–2012

Served as a technical expert witness in utility cases before the Indiana Utility Regulatory
Commission on behalf of utility ratepayers in the State of Indiana. Developed agency
position through analyses of relevant utility applications, petitions, testimony, schedules,
and exhibits. Served as agency representative in collaborative demand side management
oversight boards for electric and gas utilities.

Education

Master of Public Affairs, Environmental Policy Analysis, Indiana University Bloomington, 2010 BS, Political Science and Sociology, Arizona State University, 2007

Selected Research Publications

- B. Baatz, G. Relf, and S. Nowak. 2018. The Role of Energy Efficiency in a Distributed Energy Future. The Electricity Journal, Vol. 31, Issue 10. doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2018.11.004.
- B. Baatz, J. Barrett, and B. Stickles. 2018. Estimating the Value of Energy Efficiency to Reduce Wholesale Energy Price Volatility. Washington, DC: ACEEE. aceee.org/research-report/u1803.
- B. Baatz, G. Relf, and M. Kelly. 2017. Consequences of Large Customer Opt Out: An Ohio Example. The Electricity Journal, Vol. 30, Issue 9. doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2017.10.002.
- B. Baatz. 2017. Rate Design Matters: The Intersection of Residential Rate Design and Energy Efficiency. Washington, DC: ACEEE. aceee.org/research-report/u1703.
- B. Baatz and J. Barrett. 2017. Maryland Benefits: Examining the Results of EmPOWER Maryland through 2015. Washington, DC: ACEEE. aceee.org/research-report/u1701.
- B. Baatz and A. Gilleo. 2016. Big Savers: Experiences and Recent History of Program Administrators Achieving High Levels of Electric Savings. The Electricity Journal, Vol. 29, Issue 8. doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2016.09.009.
- B. Baatz. 2015. Everyone Benefits: Practices and Recommendations for Utility System Benefits of Energy Efficiency. Washington, DC: ACEEE. aceee.org/everyone-benefits-practices-and-recommendations.

S. Nowak, B. Baatz, A. Gilleo, M. Kushler, M. Molina, and D. York. 2015. Beyond Carrots for Utilities: A National Review of Performance Incentives for Energy Efficiency. Washington, DC: ACEEE. aceee.org/beyond-carrots-utilities-national-review.

Selected Expert Witness Regulatory Cases

Atlantic City Electric Company; New Jersey Board of Public Utilities; September 25, 2020 (Docket No. QO10010040). Client: Atlantic City Electric Company. Issue: cost benefit analysis and program design support for three-year energy efficiency plan.

New Jersey Natural Gas Company; New Jersey Board of Public Utilities; September 25, 2020 (Docket No. GO20090622). Client: New Jersey Natural Gas Company. Issue: cost benefit analysis for three-year energy efficiency filing.

Jersey Central Power and Light; New Jersey Board of Public Utilities; September 25, 2020 (Docket No. EO20090620). Client: Jersey Central Power and Light. Issue: cost benefit analysis for three-year energy efficiency filing.

Elizabethtown Gas; New Jersey Board of Public Utilities; July 31,2020 (Docket No. GR20070503). Client: Elizabethtown Gas. Issues: cost benefit analysis for energy efficiency true up filing.

Tucson Electric Power Company; Arizona Corporate Commission (Docket No. E- 01933A-19-0028); October 11, 2019. Client: Southwest Energy Efficiency Partnerships Issues: performance-based ratemaking, energy efficiency program cost recovery, time of use rate design, electric vehicle rate design.

Black Hills Colorado Electric; Public Utilities Commission of Colorado (Proceeding No. 18A-0676E), January 22, 2019. Client: Pueblo County, Colorado. Issue: time of use pilot proposal, low income bill analysis.

Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company; Oklahoma Corporate Commission (Cause No. PUD 201800140); April 22, 2019. Client: Oklahoma Energy Results. Issues: prudence of environmental cost recovery for aged coal units, integrated resource planning assessment.

Lancaster Solid Waste Management Authority; Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Docket No. ER19-342); November 14, 2018. Client: Lancaster Solid Waste Management Authority. Issue: reactive power ratemaking.

Elizabethtown Gas; New Jersey Board of Public Utilities (Docket No. GR18080860); August 8, 2018. Client: Elizabethtown Gas. Issues: cost benefit analysis for energy efficiency true up filing.

Duquesne Light Company; Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (Docket R-2018-3000124); June 25, 2018. Client: Keystone Energy Efficiency Alliance, Natural Resources Defense Council, and Clean Air Council. Issues: submetering for multifamily buildings, time of use rates, rate design.

Tucson Electric Power Company; Arizona Corporate Commission (Docket No. E- 01933A-15-0322); June 24, 2016. Client: Southwest Energy Efficiency Partnerships Issues: rate design, prepaid electricity.

PECO Electric Company; Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (Docket R-2015-2468981); June 23, 2015. Client: Keystone Energy Efficiency Alliance, Natural Resources Defense Council, and Clean Air Council. Issues: rate design, revenue decoupling.

PPL Electric Corporation; Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (Docket R-2015-2469275); June 23, 2015. Client: Keystone Energy Efficiency Alliance, Natural Resources Defense Council, and Clean Air Council. Issues: rate design, revenue decoupling.

Northern Indiana Public Service Company; Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission (Cause 44012); October 20, 2011. Representing Indiana Office of Utility Consumer Counselor. Issues: environmental control upgrades, alternate scenario economic analysis.

Indianapolis Power and Light Company; Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission (Cause 43623 DSM-5); April 26, 2012. Representing Indiana Office of Utility Consumer Counselor. Issue: energy efficiency performance incentive reconciliation.

Indianapolis Power and Light Company; Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission (Cause 44018); August 22, 2011. Representing Indiana Office of Utility Consumer Counselor. Issue: renewable energy feed in tariff design.

Indiana Michigan Power Company; Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission (Cause 44034); August 12, 2011. Representing Indiana Office of Utility Consumer Counselor. Issue: renewable energy credit benefit allocation.

Indiana Gas Company, Inc. and Indiana Gas and Electric Company; Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission (Cause 44019); May 20, 2011. Representing Indiana Office of Utility Consumer Counselor. Issue: revenue decoupling.

SOUTHWEST ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROJECT'S SECOND SET OF DATA REQUESTS TO ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY REGARDING THE APPLICATION TO APPROVE RATE SCHEDULES DESIGNED TO DEVELOP A JUST AND REASONABLE RATE OF RETURN DOCKET NO. E-01345A-19-0236 JUNE 17, 2020

SWEEP 2.8: Referencing APS response to SWEEP 1.14, please provide the

number of defaults and late payments by year for the previous seven (7) years for residential rate and small commercial rate plans. The seven-year period should include 2011 through 2018 as

APS has already provided this data for 2019.

Response: Please see attachment ExcelAPS19RC01420 for the number of

defaults (service shut off for non-payment) and the number of late payments for both residential and small commercial rate plans for the years 2011-2018. The data for number of defaults at the

customer level for 2011-2013 is unavailable.

Witness: TBD

Response to SWEEP 2.8

# of Defaults Residential Small Commercial	2018 105,206 4,755	2017 55,303 434	2016 85,433 2,737	2015 75,014 2,742	2014 67,021 2,624	2013	2012	2011
# of Late Payments Residential	2018 1,640,500	2017 1,595,102	2016 1,113,755	2015 1,156,336	2014 1,121,093	2013 1,073,333	2012 1,144,226	2011 1,243,211
Small Commercial	112,129	110,766	57,138	57,073	54,368	52,725	57,373	65,155

EXHIBIT BJB – 3 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL

EXHIBIT BJB – 4 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL

SOLAR ENERGY INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION'S THIRD SET OF DATA REQUESTS TO ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY REGARDING THE APPLICATION TO APPROVE RATE SCHEDULES DESIGNED TO DEVELOP A JUST AND REASONABLE RATE OF RETURN DOCKET NO. E-01345A-19-0236 JANUARY 30, 2020

SEIA 3.11: Please provide the hourly non-solar residential retail system load for

2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019. This request is for all residential customers that do not have solar, regardless of their rate class.

Response: Please see attachment ExcelAPS19RC00386 for January 2016

through June of 2019. Hourly non-solar residential retail system load for July through December of 2019 is not currently available

and will be provided as soon as it is complete.

Witness: Leland Snook

SOLAR ENERGY INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION'S THIRD SET OF DATA REQUESTS TO ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY REGARDING THE APPLICATION TO APPROVE RATE SCHEDULES DESIGNED TO DEVELOP A JUST AND REASONABLE RATE OF RETURN DOCKET NO. E-01345A-19-0236 JANUARY 30, 2020

SEIA 3.10: Please refer to the Company's response to RUCO 2.1.

- a. Confirm whether the data represents the gross system load (that is, before any load that is met through on-site solar) or the net system load (that is, after any load is met through on-site solar).
- b. Please provide the hourly retail system load for 2016 and 2019 containing the same data as was provided in RUCO 2.1.
- c. Please provide the hourly retail system load for 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019 that contains the either the gross system load (if RUCO 2.1 contains the net system load) or the net system load (if RUCO 2.1 contains the gross system load).

Response:

- a. The data included in RUCO 2.1 is net system load.
- b. The hourly retail system load for 2016 is included in attachment ExcelAPS19RC00384. January through June of 2019 was provided in response to RUCO 2.1. The hourly retail system load for July through December of 2019 is not currently available, but will be provided when complete.
- c. The gross system retail load is included in ExcelAPS19RC00385 for January of 2016 through June of 2019. The hourly retail system load for July through December of 2019 is not currently available, but will be provided when complete.

Witness: Leland Snook

Arizona Public Service BSC Calculation

Electric Customer-Related Costs for Aria	zona Public Service	
Expenses	Account	Residential
Meters	597	\$ -
	586	\$ 7,846,726
	Depreciation	\$ 19,883,243
Services	587	\$ 8,054
	Depreciation	\$ 8,784,347
Meter Reading	902	\$ 1,835,313
Billing	903	\$ 36,397,367
Subtotal Expenses		\$ 74,755,050
Net to Gross on Expenses		100.00%
Total Expenses		\$ 74,755,050
Rate Base		
Meters		
Plant In Service	370	\$ 260,818,873
Less Accumulated Depreciation		\$ (215,013,203)
Net Plant		\$ 45,805,670
Depreciation Expense		\$ 19,883,243
Services		
Plant In Service	369	\$ 375,419,614
Less Accumulated Depreciation		\$ (108,285,589)
Net Plant		\$ 267,134,025
Depreciation Expense		\$ 8,784,347
Meters		\$ 45,805,670
Services		\$ 267,134,025
Total Rate Base		\$ 312,939,695
Grossed Up Return (10.15 ROE)	8.02%	\$ 25,094,719
Total Customer-Related Revenue Requirement		\$ 99,849,769
Annual Bills		12,429,432
\$/Month		\$ 8.03

Raw data by account from Schedules A through H and LRS_WP2DR

SOUTHWEST ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROJECT'S SECOND SET OF DATA REQUESTS TO ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY REGARDING THE APPLICATION TO APPROVE RATE SCHEDULES DESIGNED TO DEVELOP A JUST AND REASONABLE RATE OF RETURN DOCKET NO. E-01345A-19-0236 JUNE 17, 2020

SWEEP 2.2: Please provide all measure level assumptions for all measures included in the most recently filed DSM plan. For each measure, please include the following information:

- a. first year energy savings (kWh)
- b. first year demand savings (kW)
- c. savings decay or degradation factor (if APS does not assume a savings decay, please explain why not)
- d. incremental measure cost (\$)
- e. baseline assumption
- f. installation cost (\$)
- g. net to gross assumption
- h. measure lifetime (years)

Response:

APS is still compiling the information for this response, and will provide it as soon as it is available.

Supplemental Response:

- a. Please see the attached spreadsheet ExcelAPS19RC01475.
- b. Please see the attached spreadsheet ExcelAPS19RC01475.
- c. APS does not assume a savings decay factor. The Company's "measure lifetime assumptions" account for the average persistence of savings when in some cases the savings persist longer or shorter. The savings from most measures does not significantly decay over time, and the rate of decay is also difficult to predict in most cases due to many unknown factors such as frequency of equipment maintenance over time. The cost of collecting such data outweighs the benefit and adds a layer of false precision when coupled with the other inputs used to calculate cost-effectiveness including measure life, avoided costs, incremental costs, energy and demand savings, and net-to-gross assumptions.
- d. Please see the attached spreadsheet ExcelAPS19RC01475.
- e. Please see the attached spreadsheet ExcelAPS19RC01475.
- f. The installation costs for each measure are included in the overall incremental costs that are provided in response to the Company's response to part d. These are not broken out separately because installation costs do not need to be separated out from the total incremental costs in cost

Witness: TBD Page 1 of 2

SOUTHWEST ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROJECT'S SECOND SET OF DATA REQUESTS TO ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY REGARDING THE APPLICATION TO APPROVE RATE SCHEDULES DESIGNED TO DEVELOP A JUST AND REASONABLE RATE OF RETURN DOCKET NO. E-01345A-19-0236 JUNE 17, 2020

Response to SWEEP 2.2 (continued):

effectiveness calculations.

- g. APS assumes a net to gross of 1.0 for all measures based on previous APS research showing that spillover and market influence created by DSM programs balances out freeridership.
- h. Please see the attached spreadsheet ExcelAPS19RC01475.

Witness: TBD Page 2 of 2

SOUTHWEST ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROJECT'S FIRST SET OF DATA REQUESTS TO ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY REGARDING THE APPLICATION TO APPROVE RATE SCHEDULES DESIGNED TO DEVELOP A JUST AND REASONABLE RATE OF RETURN DOCKET NO. E-01345A-19-0236 FEBRUARY 28, 2020

SWEEP 1.23: Referencing Hobbick direct testimony page 7 at lines 12-15, please

describe what is meant by "limited management of smart

thermostat".

Response: Please see the Company's response to SEIA 1.10 subpart I. The

Company will manage temperatures up to \pm 4 degrees, and the customer will be able to override the control at any time without

penalty.

Witness: Jessica Hobbick

SOUTHWEST ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROJECT'S FIRST SET OF DATA REQUESTS TO ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY REGARDING THE APPLICATION TO APPROVE RATE SCHEDULES DESIGNED TO DEVELOP A JUST AND REASONABLE RATE OF RETURN DOCKET NO. E-01345A-19-0236 FEBRUARY 28, 2020

SWEEP 1.19: Please provide an explanation of why APS is not proposing to reset the lost revenue fixed cost recovery mechanism to zero.

Response: After APS's prior rate case, concerns were expressed over the

delayed reset of the Lost Fixed Cost Recovery (LFCR) mechanism. Therefore, as part of this rate case, APS is proposing to leave the portion of the lost fixed costs presently collected in the LFCR mechanism, within that mechanism, rather than transferring it to base rates. This will ensure the estimated net bill impacts put forth in this rate case are what customers can expect on the rate

effective date.

Witness: Leland Snook